يعد هذا الموقع أكبر موقع عربي للبرامج و شروحاتها ، وهو أحد مواقع
شبكة منتديات مكتوب ، انضم الآن و احصل على فرصة استخدام و تحميل و
تنزيل و تجريب افضل برامج وادوات الكمبيوتر.
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: The two detained Swiss citizens, now held in
Libya for approximately 16 months, were each sentenced to16
months in prison by a Libyan immigration court on November 30.
According to Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto, the Swiss citizens,
who were sentenced in absentia, most likely will not leave the
embassy to attend hearings for tax-related violations, scheduled
for December 5 and 6.
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000942
NOFORN
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/1/2019
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SZ, LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN IMMIGRATION COURT SENTENCES SWISS TO 16 MONTHS IN
PRISON
REF: A) TRIPOLI 900, B) TRIPOLI 901, C) TRIPOLI 910, D) BERN 504
TRIPOLI 00000942 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) Summary: The two detained Swiss citizens, now held in
Libya for approximately 16 months, were each sentenced to16
months in prison by a Libyan immigration court on November 30.
According to Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto, the Swiss citizens,
who were sentenced in absentia, most likely will not leave the
embassy to attend hearings for tax-related violations, scheduled
for December 5 and 6. Concerned that the Libyans might up the
ante and declare him persona non grata, Lazarotto requested
December 1 that the U.S. Embassy provide material assistance to
the detained Swiss if/if that were to occur. Lazarotto said he
had been instructed by Bern to make the request of our embassy
and several EU embassies in Tripoli. Given other sensitive
issues currently pending on the bilateral agenda, we believe a
visible U.S. role in assisting the Swiss could be highly
detrimental to our own interests. Department's guidance is
requested. End Summary.
2. (C) Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto expressed his continued
concern to Pol/Econ Chief November 30 about the welfare of the
two detained Swiss citizens, who have not been allowed to the
leave Libya for over 16 months. Earlier the same day, an
immigration judge sentenced each of the two men, in absentia, to
16 months in prison. Lazarotto related that the lawyer for the
Swiss appeared before the court alone November 30, to request a
formal statement of the immigration charges; the judge refused,
claiming that the Swiss had appeared before his court shortly
after their release from Libyan custody on November 9. The
judge said he had heard their arguments at that time and had
informed them that he would issue a sentence the following week.
According to Lazarotto, the lawyer argued that to sentence the
accused without a proper trial and without the presence of legal
counsel, was a miscarriage of justice -- an argument that was
lost on the judge. The Swiss have asked their lawyer to file an
appeal to the decision.
3. (C) Lazarotto said that the Swiss were prepared to appear
before the court on November 30, but were advised by their
lawyer not to go unless they were assured that a proper trial
would take place. According to Lazarotto, three representatives
of (unspecified) EU embassies were prepared to accompany the
detained citizens to the trial. Lazarotto noted that three
additional EU embassy officials had been "on standby." [Note: A
UK political officer told poloff November 25 that the EU
embassies had decided to send lower-level representation, if
any, to the Swiss hearings, but that the decision to send a
representative would be made by the individual embassies. End
note.]
4. (C) Given the sentence, the Swiss citizens most likely will
not attend hearings before the tax court, scheduled for December
5 and 6, although they have been provided with a copy of the
tax-related charges held against them. Lazarotto noted that
execution of the sentence would pose a threat to other foreign
business interests in Libya, demonstrating that the GOL was
willing to exact retribution on businesspeople in response to
political disagreements. [Note: A few General Managers of U.S.
companies operating in Libya recently expressed similar
concerns. End note.]
5. (S/NF) In a separate meeting on December 1, Lazarotto
informed Pol/Econ Chief that he had been discussing with Bern
the various worst-case scenarios that could come now that a
sentence has been issued. He expressed his fear that the
Libyans could declare him persona non grata if he did not hand
the detained Swiss over to Libyan authorities, although he
claimed that he had not been threatened in such a way.
Lazarotto noted that in a meeting several weeks ago with the
MFA, he was told that the GOL would do "anything" to make sure
that the detained Swiss completed their sentences once verdicts
were reached. Lazarotto was accused in the same meeting of
trying to help the Swiss escape. Lazorotto continued that this
hypothetical situation would remove the last Swiss diplomat from
the country and would effectively force the detained citizens to
leave the protection of the embassy premises when their food
supply ran out. In order to protect the Swiss citizens,
Lazarotto explained that Bern had instructed him to request
third-country commitments of assistance to deliver food supplies
and to monitor their health and well-being. He confided that he
did not expect a single embassy to respond positively to the
request. Pol/Econ Chief undertook to convey the request but did
not offer any promises of assistance.
6. (C) Lazarotto did not believe the Libyans were interested in
moving forward with the bilateral relationship. Instead,
Lazarotto surmised that the GOL was now focused on pressuring EU
countries not to support the Swiss, rather than achieving a
TRIPOLI 00000942 002.2 OF 002
bilateral resolution. He explained that the EU ambassadors had
been convened by the Foreign Minister November 29 to hear his
complaints about Switzerland's continued use of its Schengen
veto on Libyan visa applicants and how that would negatively
affecting larger EU interests.
7. (S/NF) Comment: The sentencing of the Swiss businessmen
without trial underscores the serious shortcomings in Libya's
judicial systems and will send a chilling warning to foreign
investors. In the wake of this escalating, high-profile
dispute, the Swiss-Libyan political relationship continues its
downward spiral. The recent Swiss move to ban Libya from the
World Economic Forum will not improve matters, and it is not
outside of the realm of possibility that the Swiss Charge could
be asked to leave the country. If/if the Swiss Charge is in
fact PNG'ed, we believe that a direct USG role in providing
assistance to the Swiss citizens could be detrimental to our own
bilateral interests. Although we appreciate the gravity of the
humanitarian situation, we believe a visible U.S. role in
assisting the Swiss could undermine our efforts to resolve the
outstanding HEU shipment. Department's guidance on the Swiss
request for support is requested. End comment.
POLASCHIK
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief met MFA Americas Acting A/S-*****alent
Mohamed Matari December 1 to convey our serious concerns about
the security of the seven HEU-filled casks at the Tajoura
Nuclear Facility. Matari dismissed U.S. concerns, stating there
was "no one sophisticated enough" in Libya to be able to do
anything with the casks and that the chances of anything
happening were very low.
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S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000943
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY
(KELLY CUMMINS AND SARAH DICKERSON).
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/1/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG,
LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN MFA BRIEFED ON HEU SECURITY CONCERNS
REF: A) TRIPOLI 938, B) TRIPOLI 941
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief met MFA Americas Acting A/S-*****alent
Mohamed Matari December 1 to convey our serious concerns about
the security of the seven HEU-filled casks at the Tajoura
Nuclear Facility. Matari dismissed U.S. concerns, stating there
was "no one sophisticated enough" in Libya to be able to do
anything with the casks and that the chances of anything
happening were very low. He mentioned the IAEA seals as
evidence that the fuel was protected (Ref A). Pol/Econ Chief
underscored that the GOL should be concerned about the
situation, as the casks were easily transportable and Tajoura
was a poorly protected facility. U.S. DOE specialists had
recommended an increased security guard presence -- armed if
possible -- around Tajoura and the disengagement of the crane
inside the facility. Pol/Econ Chief emphasized that the casks
were easily transportable, and advised him not to be too
dismissive of the security risks involved in keeping the casks
unprotected. Matari said that he would meet with Foreign
Minister Musa Kusa today to relay our concerns.
2. (S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief also described the environmental
disaster that could take place if we did not ship the casks to
Russia for disposal within a month. The U.S. needed a decision
from the Libyan side as soon as possible on the shipment, as it
would take time to reschedule the travel of the specialized
Russian plane, including overflight permits, landing permits,
and negotiating with the Russian MFA to cancel other scheduled
stops. Matari was not aware of how complicated it would be to
schedule a return visit of the plane, although he understood
that only a few such planes exist in the world. He said he
agreed that a decision needed to be passed to us within a few
weeks.
3. (S/NF) Matari was not aware that Dr. Gashut claimed to have
prepared a document for senior regime officials listing all of
the environmental dangers associated with holding the shipment
back. Matari said that Gashut probably gave the paper to Prime
Mininster-*****alent al-Baghdad al-Mahmoudi (Gashut's boss) but
did not think it had been passed to the MFA. (Matari may well
have been unaware of any communications between Gashut and Kusa
on this issue.) Matari promised to call us after he had briefed
Kusa.
4. (S/NF) We also are seeking a meeting with Saif al-Islam
al-Qadhaif's aide Mohamed Ismail Ahmed to relay the same
information, in hopes of ensuring that senior Libyan officials
understand the grave security and safety risks posed by the
halted shipment.
POLASCHIK
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: Visiting DOE experts confirmed December 6
that the Libyan Government had taken the requisite steps to
increase the security of the seven casks of HEU, and that the
*******s -- and IAEA seals -- remained unchanged since the
shipment was halted November 25.
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NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/7/2019
TAGS: PREL, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG, LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN HEU SHIPMENT SECURE; NO DECISION YET REGARDING NEXT
STEPS
REF: A) TRIPOLI 938; B) TRIPOLI 941
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) Summary: Visiting DOE experts confirmed December 6
that the Libyan Government had taken the requisite steps to
increase the security of the seven casks of HEU, and that the
*******s -- and IAEA seals -- remained unchanged since the
shipment was halted November 25. The Libyan Government has not
yet provided guidance to its nuclear scientists regarding next
steps on the shipment, but Libyan scientists are developing
contingency plans to remove the HEU from the casks in Libya in
the event the casks must be returned empty to Russia. DOE
experts estimate that Libyan approval must be received by
December 10 in order for the shipment to be completed by the end
of December. Separately, a close aide to Saif al-Islam
al-Qadhafi indicated that the Secretary's message to Libyan FM
Musa Kusa had been positively received and passed to the
"highest levels" of the Libyan Government. The aide also
indicated that Kusa would call the Secretary in the "coming
days" to assure her that the Libyan Government had approved the
shipment. We continue to underscore with Libyan officials the
need to resolve this issue. End summary.
HEU CASKS SECURE, UNCHANGED
2. (S/NF) Visiting DOE experts confirmed December 6 that the
Libyan Government had taken the requisite steps to increase
security at the Tajura Nuclear Facility, and that the seven
casks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) appeared to have remained
unchanged since the planned shipment to Russia was halted on
November 25 (ref a). The DOE experts reported a visible
increase in the number of armed guards surrounding the facility.
They also confirmed that Tajura staff had disengaged the crane
within the facility and had assured the team that a new,
unassembled crane would not be built until after the shipment
had taken place. DOE's measurements of the spent fuel within
the casks determined that the ******* had remained unchanged.
Likewise, the IAEA seals on each cask remained in place and
uncompromised.
NO DECISIONS
3. (S/NF) The DOE team also reported that Libyan technical
specialists at Tajura had not yet received guidance from the
Libyan Government on next steps regarding the shipment. Dr. Ali
Gashut, Head of Libya's Atomic Energy Establishment, confirmed
this information in a December 7 telcon with the DOE team. The
team also reported that although the Libyan Government had sent
the Russian Government a diplomatic note confirming that the GOL
would complete its contract to return the casks to Russia by the
end of the calendar year, the note did not specify whether the
casks would be returned empty or with the HEU spent fuel
shipment. The DOE team assessed the diplomatic note as an
attempt to mollify Russian demands that the casks be returned.
POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS
4. (S/NF) The DOE team estimated that the GOL must give its
approval to move forward on the shipment by December 10 in order
for the shipment to take place by the end of December. The DOE
experts emphasized that significant lead time is required in
order set up the necessary logistical arrangements, permits and
overflight clearances for the specialized Russian plane to
return to Tripoli and transport the HEU to Russia.
5. (S/NF) The DOE team reported that Russian engineers had
begun to design a remote-controlled grapple to be used in the
event that the HEU spent fuel must be off-loaded from the casks
in Libya. Tajura staff told the DOE experts that, if GOL
approval for the shipment was not forthcoming by December 10,
the Tajura staff planned to start training on how to use the
grapple to off-load the casks. (According to DOE experts, spent
nuclear fuel has never been removed from casks for restorage;
the removal of the spent fuel in Libya would be an unprecedented
initiative.) DOE experts also commented that the return of the
empty casks to Russia, if necessary, would be best done by boat
and said they are developing contingency plans for that
scenario.
POSITIVE FEEDBACK FROM THE SECRETARY'S CALL
6. (S/NF) Separately, emboffs have attempted to seek
clarification of the Libyan Government's next steps regarding
the HEU shipment. Mohamed Ismail Ahmed, Chief of Staff of Saif
al-Islam al-Qadhafi, told Pol/Econ Chief that the Secretary's
December 3 call to Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa had
expressed the statement of commitment requested by Saif during
TRIPOLI 00000950 002 OF 002
his recent meeting with the Ambassador (ref b), and that Kusa
had passed the message to the "highest levels" of the Libyan
Government. Ahmed emphasized that Saif had made a "commitment"
to the Ambassador to ensure that the HEU shipment would be
approved by the Libyan Government, and "Saif will follow-through
on that commitment." Ahmed said Kusa intended to call the
Secretary within the "coming days" in order to personally assure
her that the GOL had approved the shipment. Emboffs also
briefed Ahmed and MFA officials on the requisite timeline and
lengthy logistical preparations needed to ensure the spent
fuel's transfer to Russia by the end of the year.
COMMENT
7. (S/NF) Ahmed's comments indicate that the Secretary's
message to Kusa was positively received. A flurry of phone
calls between DOE and Libyan experts today also indicated that
working-level Libyan officials are seeking more time to resolve
the issue, as the Libyans successfully convinced the DOE experts
to extend the deadline for a Libyan decision by two days, to
December 10 (the initial deadline proposed by DOE was December
8). At this point, we are interpreting the Libyan experts'
technical preparations for a possible unloading of the casks in
Libya as the contingency planning required to address the very
real safety and security concerns raised by the halted shipment.
We will reassess that view on December 10, and will continue to
underscore with Libyan officials the need for a resolution of
the issue this week.
POLASCHIK
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: Six leading members of the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG) imprisoned in Libya recently issued a
417-page document renouncing the use of violence and
establishing a new "code" for jihad. The group includes LIFG's
"founding fathers," individuals with ties to Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) senior leadership, including the elder
brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure.
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000955
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/8/2019
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, KISL, PHUM, LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP REVISES JIHADIST IDEOLOGY
REF: A) Tripoli 359; B) Tripoli 678
TRIPOLI 00000955 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) Summary: Six leading members of the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG) imprisoned in Libya recently issued a
417-page document renouncing the use of violence and
establishing a new "code" for jihad. The group includes LIFG's
"founding fathers," individuals with ties to Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) senior leadership, including the elder
brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure. The
recantation claims to represent a clearer understanding of the
"ethics" of Islamic shari'a law and jihad and specifically
refutes the LIFG's decades-long jihad against Muammar
al-Qadhafi. The document is the result of a two-year initiative
led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi through his Qadhafi
International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF), and
supported by Libya's internal and external security services.
As a result of the initiative, more than 200 jihadists
(approximately half of the imprisoned LIGF members) have been
released from prison, with more releases expected soon. The
initiative has been highlighted by local and international media
as a potential model in counter-radicalization and touted by the
Libyan government as a "revolutionary new method to combat
terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the region." While
Libya's terrorist rehabilitation program has drawn skepticism
from some quarters, who view the recantation as coerced and
politically motivated, the work is reportedly being reviewed by
foreign governments and has received praise as a positive GOL
contribution to regional counterterrorism efforts. While the
initiative is significant for Libya's internal politics --
simultaneously shoring up regime stability and Saif al-Islam's
credentials -- its long-term effects as a counter-radicalization
effort remain to be seen. End summary.
SAIF AL-ISLAM AND LIBYAN SECURITY FORCES FACILITATE CODE,
RELEASE OF LIFG
2. (SBU) In late September, six leading members of the Libyan
Islamic Fighting Group, being held in the Abu Salim prison,
issued a document outlining a revised interpretation of their
jihadist ideology -- one which renounces violence and claims to
adhere to a more sound Islamic theology than that of Al Qaeda
and other jihadist organizations. The authors represent the
group's historic senior leadership, including Abd al-Hakim
Balhaj (aka, Abu Abd Allah al-Sadiq, Emir of the LIFG), Abu
al-Munder al-Saidi (Jurisprudence Official of the LIFG/most
senior shari'a authority), Abd al-Wahab al-Qayed (the elder
brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure), Khalid
al-Sharif, Miftah al-Duwdi, and Mustafa Qanaifid. In the
417-page, Arabic-language document, entitled "Revisionist
Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Verification, and Judgment of
People," the authors point to ignorance and a misinterpretation
of Islamic jurisprudence as the basis for their formerly violent
expression of Islamic jihad. The authors state that "The lack
of religious knowledge, whether it was a result of an absence of
'ulama' (religious scholars) or the neglect of people in
receiving it and attaining it, or due to the absence of its
sources, is the biggest cause of errors and religious
violations." They credit a deep evaluation of their lives'
experiences, coupled with a closer study of shari'a law for
their ideological reform.
3. (SBU) The study is characterized as an attempt to recant
former LIFG doctrine and to establish a new "code" for jihad for
the benefit of the modern Muslim community. In the text, the
authors directly challenge Al Qaeda, addressing the recantation
to "anyone who we might have once had organizational or
brotherly ties with." The document gives detailed
interpretations of the "ethics and morals to jihad," which
include the rejection of violence as a means to change political
situations in Muslim majority countries whose leader is a Muslim
and condemns "the killing of women, children, the elderly,
monks/priests, wage earners, messengers, merchants and the
like." It claims that "The reduction of jihad to fighting with
the sword is an error and shortcoming."
4. (S/NF) The revised LIFG ideology is the result of a two-year
initiative, led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi in his capacity as
QDF chairman and brokered on behalf of the Libyan government.
According to press reports and Libyan officials, Saif worked
closely with the UK-based former LIFG leader, Noman Benotman, on
the effort to work on a revised ideology with the LIFG in
exchange for amnesty. QDF's lead negotiator, Salah Abdelsalam
Salah, director of the QDF's Human Rights Committee, (who also
heads Saif al-Islam's al-Ghad Media Group, ref A), said that he
had met with al-Sadiq "4-5" times in 2007, before reconciliation
TRIPOLI 00000955 002.2 OF 003
discussions began in earnest. At that time, al-Sadiq seemed
"ready to reconcile" and had indicated that his cohort shared
his serious desire to break with their violent past.
5. (S/NF) Salah detailed the two-year negotiation in a meeting
with Pol/Econ Chief, sharing several handwritten letters from
al-Sadiq to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, requesting assistance.
After the initial communication, a series of meetings began,
along two tracks: the first involving imprisoned LIFG
leadership conversing with their members; the second involving
LIFG leadership, the QDF, leading Islamic scholars, and prison
officials (from Libya's Internal Security Organization).
Libya's External Security Organization reportedly took on a
supporting role, coordinating a "reconciliation and
rehabilitation" movement among Libyan opposition figures
(including LIFG members and others) living abroad. The meetings
continued over the course of two years, and al-Sadiq wrote
letters to Saif al-Islam throughout that period with updates on
the LIFG position. In a letter dated January 16, 2009, al-Sadiq
informed Saif of the LIFG's intention to draft the recantation
work by August 1, 2009, to announce revisions to its jihadist
ideology and to reconcile with the Libyan regime. On February
23, 2009, al-Sadiq issued a press statement on behalf of the
LIFG leaders in prison, announcing the continuation of a
reconciliation dialogue with the QDF and GOL. Salah refused to
comment on international press reports that Saif faced
challenges from old guard regime officials who reportedly did
not want to pardon the prisoners.
6. (S/NF) As reported in ref B, QDF's Executive Director told us
in August that the QDF had facilitated consultations between
LIFG leadership and leading Islamic scholars, such as
Qatar-based Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qardawi and Sheikh Ali
Asalabi. In response to an early-2009 letter from al-Sadiq to
Saif requesting by title a list of more than 10 books on Islamic
jurisprudence, the QDF provided reading and reference materials
for the LIFG to study in prison. On August 1, al-Sadiq informed
Saif that the revisionist study was complete and submitted it
for review.
7. (S/NF) On August 23, to mark the beginning of Ramadan and the
Libyan leader's 40th anniversary in power, LIFG leadership
issued another press statement, this time apologizing to Muammar
al-Qadhafi for their past acts of violence against him. The
first of two rounds of prison releases took place shortly after
the statement was published, with 91 LIFG prisoners pardoned and
released. A second amnesty was announced in mid-October, with
another 43 LIFG members reportedly being released. According to
Salah, these releases constitute approximately half of the
imprisoned LIFG members, all of whom were imprisoned at Abu
Salim prison. (Saif al-Islam has publicly stated his intention
to demolish the facility, infamous for a 1996 uprising that left
1200 prisoners dead, after the last prisoners have been
released.) Salah reported that another round of amnesties would
take place in the coming weeks, with Saif's ultimate goal being
100-percent prisoner release. In a separate effort, Salah said
that the GOL has released some 62 members of other "jihadist
groups" from Abu Salim prison based on their recantations of
violent jihad.
8. (S/NF) According to Salah, the revisionist study represented
the dissolution of the LIFG organization in Libya. Upon
release, each former LIFG member becomes a "regular" citizen and
is allowed to "do what regular Libyans do," including
unrestricted movement and the freedom to travel abroad. Salah
vehemently denied the assertion among some analysts that the
LIFG leaders reconciled due to lucrative incentive packages
offered by the GOL. He claimed that the only benefits given to
former LIFG prisoners upon release were "job training and
employment assistance, financial support for medical care, if
needed, and living expenses until the prisoners are able to find
jobs." Some press reports indicate that as a condition of the
pardon, former militants are required to pledge not to
participate in Libyan politics, although they are able to speak
in mosques. [Comment: Even if they wanted to participate in
politics, how they would do so is unclear, given that political
parties are outlawed in Libya. End comment.]
9. (SBU) Saif al-Islam's involvement in the reconciliation
effort has received widespread local and international media
attention -- state-run print media has published excerpts of the
text and praised Saif for his work, and CNN recently broadcast a
feature report on the efforts. The CNN report praises the
initiative, describing Saif's motivation as not only ending the
TRIPOLI 00000955 003.2 OF 003
violent movement against the regime but also combating Al
Qaeda's "growing influence in the region." CNN further claimed
that, "In essence the new code for jihad is exactly what the
West has been waiting for: a credible challenge from within
jihadist ranks to Al Qaeda's ideology." International
think-tanks such as the Quilliam Foundation and Jihadica have
analyzed the efforts and the LIFG document, with the latter
calling it a "very sweeping repudiation not just of Salafi
jihadism but of all forms of revolutionary Islamism in general."
10. (C) Some observers believe the Libyan counter-radicalization
experiment could be used as a model across the region and state
that it differs from similar efforts, such as those in Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt in its methods and target audience.
The September 17 edition of the US-based "Terrorism Monitor"
credited the initiative's success to the "full institutional
participation of the LIFG and its leadership," in the reform
project. By contrast, the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni models, for
example, relied on "the conversion of militant individuals who
may remain drawn (willingly or otherwise) to their former
organizations." In Egypt, the work of the Egyptian Islamic
Jihad, while renouncing violence, maintained a fairly extreme
ideology, propounded primarily by a single leader of the
organization.
11. (S/NF) The Libyan government proudly explained the efforts
to reconcile with LIFG members during a September 6 meeting with
NEA A/S Feltman. During the meeting, Director of Military
Intelligence and Muammar al-Qadhafi confidante, Abdullah
al-Sanussi, described the effort as a "revolutionary new method
to combat terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the
region," and presented a pre-published copy of the recantation
study. UK diplomats have told us that the Libyans have also
given them a copy of the work, which they are translating in
full and analyzing as a possible model for
counter-radicalization efforts. Other diplomats have praised
the program as a positive GOL contribution to regional
counterterrorism efforts.
12. (S/NF) Amidst the positive international attention currently
focused on Saif al-Islam's LIFG counter-radicalization program,
some observers have expressed skepticism to emboffs about the
project. One Western diplomat confided his personal view that
the efforts were purely political and that even the Islamic
scholars involved in the effort, such as Yusuf al-Qardawi, had
political agendas. A number of private Libyan citizens agreed
with the opinions expressed on some foreign-based blogs, that
Libya's security organizations forced the LIFG leaders to write
the recantation and that some LIFG members -- imprisoned in Abu
Salim prison for decades -- were simply motivated by the
prospect of pardon and the hope of reuniting with their
families.
COMMENT
13. (S/NF) While local and international opinions are still
being formulated on the initiative, the LIFG's renouncement of
violent jihad and extremist ideology, and the document's direct
challenge to Al Qaeda, represents a significant achievement for
Saif al-Islam in particular and the Libyan government as a
whole. The primary motivation for Muammar al-Qadhafi's backing
of the initiative was undoubtedly regime security, and for Saif
al-Islam, it may also have been political, designed to shore up
his credentials both at home and abroad. We suspect that the
Libyan Government may well have contributed significant
resources in the form of "financial assistance" to help ensure
that the newly released fighters maintain their end of the
bargain. The GOL's immediate payoff on this investment is
significant: the elimination of one of Qadhafi's most staunch
opposition groups and a high-profile public relations coup in
Libya's ongoing quest to position itself as a leader in the
Islamic world. However, the long-term effects of the
initiative, particularly with respect to the ideology of jihad
and global counter-radicalization efforts, remains to be seen.
POLASCHIK
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: During recent meetings, Saif al-Islam
al-Qadhafi's staff has shown an increased interest in bilateral
military and security issues, particularly requests linked to
Captain Khamis al-Qadhafi, including purchases of helicopters
and "Tiger" vehicle components, and M113 refurbishment. Saif's
staff also indicated Libya was interested in purchasing French
SCALP cruise missiles to replace its SCUD Bs.
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NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, KACT, MCAP, MASS, LY
SUBJECT: SAIF AL-ISLAM'S STAFF REACHES OUT ON POL-MIL ISSUES
REF: A) TRIPOLI 941; B) TRIPOLI 924; C) TRIPOLI 208
TRIPOLI 00000960 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) Summary: During recent meetings, Saif al-Islam
al-Qadhafi's staff has shown an increased interest in bilateral
military and security issues, particularly requests linked to
Captain Khamis al-Qadhafi, including purchases of helicopters
and "Tiger" vehicle components, and M113 refurbishment. Saif's
staff also indicated Libya was interested in purchasing French
SCALP cruise missiles to replace its SCUD Bs. This increased
attention may be reflective of Saif's broader plans to
consolidate military and security issues within his expanding
"General Coordinator" portfolio. Saif's staff declined to
comment on any future division of responsibility between Saif
al-Islam and Mutassim al-Qadhafi in these areas. The clear
interest in military sales represented by Saif's staff on behalf
of Khamis al-Qadhafi may be indicative of Saif's attempts to
curry his youngest brother's favor. End Summary.
SAIF'S AIDE ADVOCATES ON BEHALF OF KHAMIS
2. (S/NF) During December 2 and 9 meetings with Pol/Econ Chief
and DATT, Mohamed Ismail Ahmed, close aide to Saif al-Islam
al-Qadhafi, expressed interest in military equipment sales,
particularly purchase requests from Khamis al-Qadhafi's 32nd
Brigade. Ahmed labeled "strange" the "broad" list of equipment
requests made by National Security Advisor Mutassim al-Qadhafi
to the Department of Defense earlier this year, and focused
discussion on Libyan military requests for helicopters and
vehicles -- requests that likely derived from the "Khamis
Brigade." Ahmed sought an explanation on the USG refusal of the
sale of Little Bird helicopters to the Libyan military, and
designated for the "Khamis Brigade." Stating that the Libyan
military was still very interested in purchasing the aircraft,
he suggested the helicopters have all armament removed so they
could be categorized as "non-lethal equipment." DATT informed
him that the Libyan military was free to purchase a number of
other helicopter systems that the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency had already cleared for Libyan military purchase. Ahmed
insisted that the Libyan military wanted to purchase the Little
Bird helicopters.
3. (S/NF) Additionally, Ahmed requested an update on the status
of the license request by a jointly owned U.S. and Turkish
company to refurbish Libya's fleet of M113 vehicles, in which
Khamis al-Qadhafi had expressed a personal interest. He asked
emboffs to provide him with a written update on the status of
the request, which he would then pass to Khamis. Ahmed then
reiterated a GOL complaint (which Saif had raised with the
Ambassador on November 27, ref A) that a UAE company could not
meet the requirements for the sale of a fleet of Jordanian
"Tiger" 4x4 vehicles to the Libyan military, as the U.S.
manufacturer of the vehicles' engines would not approve the
sale. DATT informed Ahmed that, per discussions with the
manufacturer, it was that company's policy, not U.S. law, that
prohibited the sale of equipment to the Government of Libya.
"We have a long way to go," retorted Ahmed. He stated that if
the UAE could not outfit the Tiger vehicles with American
engines, then the Libyans would purchase engines from
Mercedes-Benz. "But we want American engines," he added. DATT
extended the possibility that Libyan military procurement
provide a Letter of Request to purchase the engines via the
Foreign Military Sales process, which Ahmed said he would
discuss with the appropriate officials.
SAIF'S AIDE TO FOLLOW UP ON MILITARY ENGAGEMENT OFFERS
4. (S/NF) In addition to the three issues raised, DATT educated
Ahmed on the five pending Letters of Offer and Assistance (LOA)
that have been held up in Libya's military procurement office
for several months, all of which focus on C-130 related
purchases and refurbishment requests, as well as the full range
of military exchange and training opportunities that have been
offered to the Libyans over the last year. While Ahmed did not
show interest in the C-130 LOAs, he seemed surprised by the
number of military exchange and training opportunities on offer
and was particularly shocked that most of them had gone
unanswered. "Who did you make these offers to?" he asked. He
took particular interest in an offer made for Khamis to travel
around the United States to tour U.S. military installations and
pledged to follow-up directly with Khamis on that program.
LIBYA POTENTIALLY IDENTIFIES SCUD B REPLACEMENT SYSTEM
5. (S/NF) Separating the topic as one that was "political" as
well as "military," Ahmed informed emboffs that the Libyans may
have found an MTCR-compliant "replacement system" for its stock
of SCUD B missiles. He explained that the GOL had discussed,
TRIPOLI 00000960 002.2 OF 002
during a recent high-level French visit, the purchase of the
French SCALP Missile (a.k.a. "Storm Shadow") to replace the SCUD
B. Ahmed asked whether the USG would consider the equipment
MTCR-compliant, and if so, whether the USG would bless the sale.
Emboffs offered to pass the information to Washington for
guidance. "How soon do you think you will know?" he asked. We
told him we would follow-up as soon as we had more information
for him. (Note: The SCALP Missile is an air launched
cruise-launched missile, fired from Rafale as well as other
combat aircraft. From a separate source, DATT learned December
10 that although France is keen to sell Rafale jets to Libya, it
is not interested in selling the Libyans the SCALP Missile,
which is deemed "too sensitive." End note.)
SECURITY ROLE FOR SAIF?
6. (S/NF) When asked whether Saif would be the point person for
military and security issues if and when he takes on his new
position as "General Coordinator," Ahmed advised -- after a long
pause -- that the Embassy should continue to track
military-related issues through Mutassim's office and to copy
information to Saif's office (Ahmed) from now on.
7. (S/NF) Comment: The concerted attention that Saif's close
advisor devoted to military and security issues during recent
meetings with Emboffs suggests that Saif is beginning to insert
himself into the political-military and security spheres. The
discussion of Khamis' requests in particular may indicate that
Saif is trying to curry favor with his little brother. Given
the fact that the "Khamis Brigade" is considered the
best-equipped and most capable of defending the regime, it seems
only natural that anyone intent on assuming power would try to
align himself with Khamis. Ahmed's cautious advice to continue
to track military and security issues through Mutassim's office
seems to indicate that Saif's interest in these issues is still
informal and perhaps not fully vetted within the Libyan
government. End Comment.
CRETZ
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) The Russian Rosatom Agency reported to DOE officials
today that it had received a letter from Libya's Tajoura Nuclear
Research Center informing the Russians that the Libyan side had
received the necessary approval to allow the shipment of Highly
Enriched Uranium to proceed for transfer to Russia.
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NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY (KELLY
CUMMINS).
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2019
TAGS: PREL, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG, LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA HEU UPDATE: LETTER SENT TO RUSSIANS APPROVING
SHIPMENT
REF: TRIPOLI 950
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) The Russian Rosatom Agency reported to DOE officials
today that it had received a letter from Libya's Tajoura Nuclear
Research Center informing the Russians that the Libyan side had
received the necessary approval to allow the shipment of Highly
Enriched Uranium to proceed for transfer to Russia. The full
text of the letter is contained in para 2.
2. (S) In a letter dated December 15, 2009, on the letterhead of
Libya's Nuclear Energy Establishment, the Libyans wrote: "Dear
Mr. Kazakov, FCNRS Director, With reference to your letter dated
Dec. 14th, 2009, please be informed that the necessary license
required for the shipment of the SNF [spent nuclear fuel] from
Libya to Russia has been obtained. Hence, you are kindly asked
to send the plane to Mitiga International Airport on the 20th of
Dec. 2009 in accordance to the proposed schedule. Yours
sincerely, Almhdi Gallab, Acting Director, Tajoura Nuclear
Research Center."
3. (S/NF) The Russian Embassy reported December 14 that it was
processing the landing permits required for the specialized
Russian plane to land at Mitiga Airport on December 20. If all
proceeds according to the DOE and Rosatom schedule, the shipment
should take place on December 21. DOE experts are scheduled to
return to Libya on December 18.
4. (S/NF) Comment: While the Libyan letter constitutes the
first GOL action on this issue since the shipment was halted on
November 25, we have not yet received confirmation from senior
Libyan policy officials that the necessary approvals have been
given. The Ambassador is seeking a meeting with Foreign Minister
Musa Kusa to confirm this information.
CRETZ
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: Six leading members of the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG) imprisoned in Libya recently issued a
417-page document renouncing the use of violence and
establishing a new "code" for jihad. The group includes LIFG's
"founding fathers," individuals with ties to Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) senior leadership, including the elder
brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure.
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NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG.
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/8/2019
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, KISL, PHUM, LY
SUBJECT: LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP REVISES JIHADIST IDEOLOGY
REF: A) Tripoli 359; B) Tripoli 678
TRIPOLI 00000955 001.2 OF 003
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) Summary: Six leading members of the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG) imprisoned in Libya recently issued a
417-page document renouncing the use of violence and
establishing a new "code" for jihad. The group includes LIFG's
"founding fathers," individuals with ties to Al Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) senior leadership, including the elder
brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure. The
recantation claims to represent a clearer understanding of the
"ethics" of Islamic shari'a law and jihad and specifically
refutes the LIFG's decades-long jihad against Muammar
al-Qadhafi. The document is the result of a two-year initiative
led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi through his Qadhafi
International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF), and
supported by Libya's internal and external security services.
As a result of the initiative, more than 200 jihadists
(approximately half of the imprisoned LIGF members) have been
released from prison, with more releases expected soon. The
initiative has been highlighted by local and international media
as a potential model in counter-radicalization and touted by the
Libyan government as a "revolutionary new method to combat
terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the region." While
Libya's terrorist rehabilitation program has drawn skepticism
from some quarters, who view the recantation as coerced and
politically motivated, the work is reportedly being reviewed by
foreign governments and has received praise as a positive GOL
contribution to regional counterterrorism efforts. While the
initiative is significant for Libya's internal politics --
simultaneously shoring up regime stability and Saif al-Islam's
credentials -- its long-term effects as a counter-radicalization
effort remain to be seen. End summary.
SAIF AL-ISLAM AND LIBYAN SECURITY FORCES FACILITATE CODE,
RELEASE OF LIFG
2. (SBU) In late September, six leading members of the Libyan
Islamic Fighting Group, being held in the Abu Salim prison,
issued a document outlining a revised interpretation of their
jihadist ideology -- one which renounces violence and claims to
adhere to a more sound Islamic theology than that of Al Qaeda
and other jihadist organizations. The authors represent the
group's historic senior leadership, including Abd al-Hakim
Balhaj (aka, Abu Abd Allah al-Sadiq, Emir of the LIFG), Abu
al-Munder al-Saidi (Jurisprudence Official of the LIFG/most
senior shari'a authority), Abd al-Wahab al-Qayed (the elder
brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure), Khalid
al-Sharif, Miftah al-Duwdi, and Mustafa Qanaifid. In the
417-page, Arabic-language document, entitled "Revisionist
Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Verification, and Judgment of
People," the authors point to ignorance and a misinterpretation
of Islamic jurisprudence as the basis for their formerly violent
expression of Islamic jihad. The authors state that "The lack
of religious knowledge, whether it was a result of an absence of
'ulama' (religious scholars) or the neglect of people in
receiving it and attaining it, or due to the absence of its
sources, is the biggest cause of errors and religious
violations." They credit a deep evaluation of their lives'
experiences, coupled with a closer study of shari'a law for
their ideological reform.
3. (SBU) The study is characterized as an attempt to recant
former LIFG doctrine and to establish a new "code" for jihad for
the benefit of the modern Muslim community. In the text, the
authors directly challenge Al Qaeda, addressing the recantation
to "anyone who we might have once had organizational or
brotherly ties with." The document gives detailed
interpretations of the "ethics and morals to jihad," which
include the rejection of violence as a means to change political
situations in Muslim majority countries whose leader is a Muslim
and condemns "the killing of women, children, the elderly,
monks/priests, wage earners, messengers, merchants and the
like." It claims that "The reduction of jihad to fighting with
the sword is an error and shortcoming."
4. (S/NF) The revised LIFG ideology is the result of a two-year
initiative, led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi in his capacity as
QDF chairman and brokered on behalf of the Libyan government.
According to press reports and Libyan officials, Saif worked
closely with the UK-based former LIFG leader, Noman Benotman, on
the effort to work on a revised ideology with the LIFG in
exchange for amnesty. QDF's lead negotiator, Salah Abdelsalam
Salah, director of the QDF's Human Rights Committee, (who also
heads Saif al-Islam's al-Ghad Media Group, ref A), said that he
had met with al-Sadiq "4-5" times in 2007, before reconciliation
TRIPOLI 00000955 002.2 OF 003
discussions began in earnest. At that time, al-Sadiq seemed
"ready to reconcile" and had indicated that his cohort shared
his serious desire to break with their violent past.
5. (S/NF) Salah detailed the two-year negotiation in a meeting
with Pol/Econ Chief, sharing several handwritten letters from
al-Sadiq to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, requesting assistance.
After the initial communication, a series of meetings began,
along two tracks: the first involving imprisoned LIFG
leadership conversing with their members; the second involving
LIFG leadership, the QDF, leading Islamic scholars, and prison
officials (from Libya's Internal Security Organization).
Libya's External Security Organization reportedly took on a
supporting role, coordinating a "reconciliation and
rehabilitation" movement among Libyan opposition figures
(including LIFG members and others) living abroad. The meetings
continued over the course of two years, and al-Sadiq wrote
letters to Saif al-Islam throughout that period with updates on
the LIFG position. In a letter dated January 16, 2009, al-Sadiq
informed Saif of the LIFG's intention to draft the recantation
work by August 1, 2009, to announce revisions to its jihadist
ideology and to reconcile with the Libyan regime. On February
23, 2009, al-Sadiq issued a press statement on behalf of the
LIFG leaders in prison, announcing the continuation of a
reconciliation dialogue with the QDF and GOL. Salah refused to
comment on international press reports that Saif faced
challenges from old guard regime officials who reportedly did
not want to pardon the prisoners.
6. (S/NF) As reported in ref B, QDF's Executive Director told us
in August that the QDF had facilitated consultations between
LIFG leadership and leading Islamic scholars, such as
Qatar-based Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qardawi and Sheikh Ali
Asalabi. In response to an early-2009 letter from al-Sadiq to
Saif requesting by title a list of more than 10 books on Islamic
jurisprudence, the QDF provided reading and reference materials
for the LIFG to study in prison. On August 1, al-Sadiq informed
Saif that the revisionist study was complete and submitted it
for review.
7. (S/NF) On August 23, to mark the beginning of Ramadan and the
Libyan leader's 40th anniversary in power, LIFG leadership
issued another press statement, this time apologizing to Muammar
al-Qadhafi for their past acts of violence against him. The
first of two rounds of prison releases took place shortly after
the statement was published, with 91 LIFG prisoners pardoned and
released. A second amnesty was announced in mid-October, with
another 43 LIFG members reportedly being released. According to
Salah, these releases constitute approximately half of the
imprisoned LIFG members, all of whom were imprisoned at Abu
Salim prison. (Saif al-Islam has publicly stated his intention
to demolish the facility, infamous for a 1996 uprising that left
1200 prisoners dead, after the last prisoners have been
released.) Salah reported that another round of amnesties would
take place in the coming weeks, with Saif's ultimate goal being
100-percent prisoner release. In a separate effort, Salah said
that the GOL has released some 62 members of other "jihadist
groups" from Abu Salim prison based on their recantations of
violent jihad.
8. (S/NF) According to Salah, the revisionist study represented
the dissolution of the LIFG organization in Libya. Upon
release, each former LIFG member becomes a "regular" citizen and
is allowed to "do what regular Libyans do," including
unrestricted movement and the freedom to travel abroad. Salah
vehemently denied the assertion among some analysts that the
LIFG leaders reconciled due to lucrative incentive packages
offered by the GOL. He claimed that the only benefits given to
former LIFG prisoners upon release were "job training and
employment assistance, financial support for medical care, if
needed, and living expenses until the prisoners are able to find
jobs." Some press reports indicate that as a condition of the
pardon, former militants are required to pledge not to
participate in Libyan politics, although they are able to speak
in mosques. [Comment: Even if they wanted to participate in
politics, how they would do so is unclear, given that political
parties are outlawed in Libya. End comment.]
9. (SBU) Saif al-Islam's involvement in the reconciliation
effort has received widespread local and international media
attention -- state-run print media has published excerpts of the
text and praised Saif for his work, and CNN recently broadcast a
feature report on the efforts. The CNN report praises the
initiative, describing Saif's motivation as not only ending the
TRIPOLI 00000955 003.2 OF 003
violent movement against the regime but also combating Al
Qaeda's "growing influence in the region." CNN further claimed
that, "In essence the new code for jihad is exactly what the
West has been waiting for: a credible challenge from within
jihadist ranks to Al Qaeda's ideology." International
think-tanks such as the Quilliam Foundation and Jihadica have
analyzed the efforts and the LIFG document, with the latter
calling it a "very sweeping repudiation not just of Salafi
jihadism but of all forms of revolutionary Islamism in general."
10. (C) Some observers believe the Libyan counter-radicalization
experiment could be used as a model across the region and state
that it differs from similar efforts, such as those in Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt in its methods and target audience.
The September 17 edition of the US-based "Terrorism Monitor"
credited the initiative's success to the "full institutional
participation of the LIFG and its leadership," in the reform
project. By contrast, the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni models, for
example, relied on "the conversion of militant individuals who
may remain drawn (willingly or otherwise) to their former
organizations." In Egypt, the work of the Egyptian Islamic
Jihad, while renouncing violence, maintained a fairly extreme
ideology, propounded primarily by a single leader of the
organization.
11. (S/NF) The Libyan government proudly explained the efforts
to reconcile with LIFG members during a September 6 meeting with
NEA A/S Feltman. During the meeting, Director of Military
Intelligence and Muammar al-Qadhafi confidante, Abdullah
al-Sanussi, described the effort as a "revolutionary new method
to combat terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the
region," and presented a pre-published copy of the recantation
study. UK diplomats have told us that the Libyans have also
given them a copy of the work, which they are translating in
full and analyzing as a possible model for
counter-radicalization efforts. Other diplomats have praised
the program as a positive GOL contribution to regional
counterterrorism efforts.
12. (S/NF) Amidst the positive international attention currently
focused on Saif al-Islam's LIFG counter-radicalization program,
some observers have expressed skepticism to emboffs about the
project. One Western diplomat confided his personal view that
the efforts were purely political and that even the Islamic
scholars involved in the effort, such as Yusuf al-Qardawi, had
political agendas. A number of private Libyan citizens agreed
with the opinions expressed on some foreign-based blogs, that
Libya's security organizations forced the LIFG leaders to write
the recantation and that some LIFG members -- imprisoned in Abu
Salim prison for decades -- were simply motivated by the
prospect of pardon and the hope of reuniting with their
families.
COMMENT
13. (S/NF) While local and international opinions are still
being formulated on the initiative, the LIFG's renouncement of
violent jihad and extremist ideology, and the document's direct
challenge to Al Qaeda, represents a significant achievement for
Saif al-Islam in particular and the Libyan government as a
whole. The primary motivation for Muammar al-Qadhafi's backing
of the initiative was undoubtedly regime security, and for Saif
al-Islam, it may also have been political, designed to shore up
his credentials both at home and abroad. We suspect that the
Libyan Government may well have contributed significant
resources in the form of "financial assistance" to help ensure
that the newly released fighters maintain their end of the
bargain. The GOL's immediate payoff on this investment is
significant: the elimination of one of Qadhafi's most staunch
opposition groups and a high-profile public relations coup in
Libya's ongoing quest to position itself as a leader in the
Islamic world. However, the long-term effects of the
initiative, particularly with respect to the ideology of jihad
and global counter-radicalization efforts, remains to be seen.
POLASCHIK
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: During recent meetings, Saif al-Islam
al-Qadhafi's staff has shown an increased interest in bilateral
military and security issues, particularly requests linked to
Captain Khamis al-Qadhafi, including purchases of helicopters
and "Tiger" vehicle components, and M113 refurbishment. Saif's
staff also indicated Libya was interested in purchasing French
SCALP cruise missiles to replace its SCUD Bs.
Full Document
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NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, KACT, MCAP, MASS, LY
SUBJECT: SAIF AL-ISLAM'S STAFF REACHES OUT ON POL-MIL ISSUES
REF: A) TRIPOLI 941; B) TRIPOLI 924; C) TRIPOLI 208
TRIPOLI 00000960 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) Summary: During recent meetings, Saif al-Islam
al-Qadhafi's staff has shown an increased interest in bilateral
military and security issues, particularly requests linked to
Captain Khamis al-Qadhafi, including purchases of helicopters
and "Tiger" vehicle components, and M113 refurbishment. Saif's
staff also indicated Libya was interested in purchasing French
SCALP cruise missiles to replace its SCUD Bs. This increased
attention may be reflective of Saif's broader plans to
consolidate military and security issues within his expanding
"General Coordinator" portfolio. Saif's staff declined to
comment on any future division of responsibility between Saif
al-Islam and Mutassim al-Qadhafi in these areas. The clear
interest in military sales represented by Saif's staff on behalf
of Khamis al-Qadhafi may be indicative of Saif's attempts to
curry his youngest brother's favor. End Summary.
SAIF'S AIDE ADVOCATES ON BEHALF OF KHAMIS
2. (S/NF) During December 2 and 9 meetings with Pol/Econ Chief
and DATT, Mohamed Ismail Ahmed, close aide to Saif al-Islam
al-Qadhafi, expressed interest in military equipment sales,
particularly purchase requests from Khamis al-Qadhafi's 32nd
Brigade. Ahmed labeled "strange" the "broad" list of equipment
requests made by National Security Advisor Mutassim al-Qadhafi
to the Department of Defense earlier this year, and focused
discussion on Libyan military requests for helicopters and
vehicles -- requests that likely derived from the "Khamis
Brigade." Ahmed sought an explanation on the USG refusal of the
sale of Little Bird helicopters to the Libyan military, and
designated for the "Khamis Brigade." Stating that the Libyan
military was still very interested in purchasing the aircraft,
he suggested the helicopters have all armament removed so they
could be categorized as "non-lethal equipment." DATT informed
him that the Libyan military was free to purchase a number of
other helicopter systems that the Defense Security Cooperation
Agency had already cleared for Libyan military purchase. Ahmed
insisted that the Libyan military wanted to purchase the Little
Bird helicopters.
3. (S/NF) Additionally, Ahmed requested an update on the status
of the license request by a jointly owned U.S. and Turkish
company to refurbish Libya's fleet of M113 vehicles, in which
Khamis al-Qadhafi had expressed a personal interest. He asked
emboffs to provide him with a written update on the status of
the request, which he would then pass to Khamis. Ahmed then
reiterated a GOL complaint (which Saif had raised with the
Ambassador on November 27, ref A) that a UAE company could not
meet the requirements for the sale of a fleet of Jordanian
"Tiger" 4x4 vehicles to the Libyan military, as the U.S.
manufacturer of the vehicles' engines would not approve the
sale. DATT informed Ahmed that, per discussions with the
manufacturer, it was that company's policy, not U.S. law, that
prohibited the sale of equipment to the Government of Libya.
"We have a long way to go," retorted Ahmed. He stated that if
the UAE could not outfit the Tiger vehicles with American
engines, then the Libyans would purchase engines from
Mercedes-Benz. "But we want American engines," he added. DATT
extended the possibility that Libyan military procurement
provide a Letter of Request to purchase the engines via the
Foreign Military Sales process, which Ahmed said he would
discuss with the appropriate officials.
SAIF'S AIDE TO FOLLOW UP ON MILITARY ENGAGEMENT OFFERS
4. (S/NF) In addition to the three issues raised, DATT educated
Ahmed on the five pending Letters of Offer and Assistance (LOA)
that have been held up in Libya's military procurement office
for several months, all of which focus on C-130 related
purchases and refurbishment requests, as well as the full range
of military exchange and training opportunities that have been
offered to the Libyans over the last year. While Ahmed did not
show interest in the C-130 LOAs, he seemed surprised by the
number of military exchange and training opportunities on offer
and was particularly shocked that most of them had gone
unanswered. "Who did you make these offers to?" he asked. He
took particular interest in an offer made for Khamis to travel
around the United States to tour U.S. military installations and
pledged to follow-up directly with Khamis on that program.
LIBYA POTENTIALLY IDENTIFIES SCUD B REPLACEMENT SYSTEM
5. (S/NF) Separating the topic as one that was "political" as
well as "military," Ahmed informed emboffs that the Libyans may
have found an MTCR-compliant "replacement system" for its stock
of SCUD B missiles. He explained that the GOL had discussed,
TRIPOLI 00000960 002.2 OF 002
during a recent high-level French visit, the purchase of the
French SCALP Missile (a.k.a. "Storm Shadow") to replace the SCUD
B. Ahmed asked whether the USG would consider the equipment
MTCR-compliant, and if so, whether the USG would bless the sale.
Emboffs offered to pass the information to Washington for
guidance. "How soon do you think you will know?" he asked. We
told him we would follow-up as soon as we had more information
for him. (Note: The SCALP Missile is an air launched
cruise-launched missile, fired from Rafale as well as other
combat aircraft. From a separate source, DATT learned December
10 that although France is keen to sell Rafale jets to Libya, it
is not interested in selling the Libyans the SCALP Missile,
which is deemed "too sensitive." End note.)
SECURITY ROLE FOR SAIF?
6. (S/NF) When asked whether Saif would be the point person for
military and security issues if and when he takes on his new
position as "General Coordinator," Ahmed advised -- after a long
pause -- that the Embassy should continue to track
military-related issues through Mutassim's office and to copy
information to Saif's office (Ahmed) from now on.
7. (S/NF) Comment: The concerted attention that Saif's close
advisor devoted to military and security issues during recent
meetings with Emboffs suggests that Saif is beginning to insert
himself into the political-military and security spheres. The
discussion of Khamis' requests in particular may indicate that
Saif is trying to curry favor with his little brother. Given
the fact that the "Khamis Brigade" is considered the
best-equipped and most capable of defending the regime, it seems
only natural that anyone intent on assuming power would try to
align himself with Khamis. Ahmed's cautious advice to continue
to track military and security issues through Mutassim's office
seems to indicate that Saif's interest in these issues is still
informal and perhaps not fully vetted within the Libyan
government. End Comment.
CRETZ
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) The Russian Rosatom Agency reported to DOE officials
today that it had received a letter from Libya's Tajoura Nuclear
Research Center informing the Russians that the Libyan side had
received the necessary approval to allow the shipment of Highly
Enriched Uranium to proceed for transfer to Russia.
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S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000966
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY (KELLY
CUMMINS).
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2019
TAGS: PREL, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG, LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA HEU UPDATE: LETTER SENT TO RUSSIANS APPROVING
SHIPMENT
REF: TRIPOLI 950
CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) The Russian Rosatom Agency reported to DOE officials
today that it had received a letter from Libya's Tajoura Nuclear
Research Center informing the Russians that the Libyan side had
received the necessary approval to allow the shipment of Highly
Enriched Uranium to proceed for transfer to Russia. The full
text of the letter is contained in para 2.
2. (S) In a letter dated December 15, 2009, on the letterhead of
Libya's Nuclear Energy Establishment, the Libyans wrote: "Dear
Mr. Kazakov, FCNRS Director, With reference to your letter dated
Dec. 14th, 2009, please be informed that the necessary license
required for the shipment of the SNF [spent nuclear fuel] from
Libya to Russia has been obtained. Hence, you are kindly asked
to send the plane to Mitiga International Airport on the 20th of
Dec. 2009 in accordance to the proposed schedule. Yours
sincerely, Almhdi Gallab, Acting Director, Tajoura Nuclear
Research Center."
3. (S/NF) The Russian Embassy reported December 14 that it was
processing the landing permits required for the specialized
Russian plane to land at Mitiga Airport on December 20. If all
proceeds according to the DOE and Rosatom schedule, the shipment
should take place on December 21. DOE experts are scheduled to
return to Libya on December 18.
4. (S/NF) Comment: While the Libyan letter constitutes the
first GOL action on this issue since the shipment was halted on
November 25, we have not yet received confirmation from senior
Libyan policy officials that the necessary approvals have been
given. The Ambassador is seeking a meeting with Foreign Minister
Musa Kusa to confirm this information.
CRETZ
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) After raising a sensitive proposal on another topic
(septel) during their hastily-called late Friday evening
meeting, and only in response to the Ambassador's insistence
that the HEU issue be raised, Foreign Minister Musa Kusa told
the Ambassador on December 18 that there would be "no problem"
regarding the planned December 21 transfer to Russia of Libya's
remaining Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel.
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S E C R E T TRIPOLI 001022
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY (KELLYCUMMINS, SARAH
DICKERSON)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019
TAGS: PREL, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG, LY
SUBJECT: LIBYA HEU UPDATE
REF: TRIPOLI 966
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) After raising a sensitive proposal on another topic
(septel) during their hastily-called late Friday evening
meeting, and only in response to the Ambassador's insistence
that the HEU issue be raised, Foreign Minister Musa Kusa told
the Ambassador on December 18 that there would be "no problem"
regarding the planned December 21 transfer to Russia of Libya's
remaining Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel. The
Ambassador underscored the urgency of this issue to the
bilateral relationship, noting that the Secretary, NEA A/S and
National Security Advisor had been engaged in seeking a
resolution. He wanted to ensure that Kusa was aware of the
imminent December 18 deadline for the U.S. to either commit or
withdraw its 800,000 USD financial obligation for contracting
for the Russian plane. The Ambassador told Kusa that once the
spent fuel transfer is successfully completed, the U.S. would be
in a better position to discuss moving ahead on the full range
of the bilateral relationship, including the several issues
raised by Kusa in his December 3 conversation with the
Secretary. At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador handed
over the letter discussed by the NEA A/S and Kusa on December 12
to ensure that the U.S. had done everything to effect completion
of the mission.
2. (S/NF) Separately, the DOE team visited the Tajoura Nuclear
Center on December 19 and 20, and reported that all necessary
preparations were underway for the shipment to take place on
December 21. The team's Libyan counterparts said they had
received all necessary approvals from the Libyan government.
The spent fuel casks will be loaded into shipping containers
today and transported from Tajoura to Mitiga Air Base later this
evening. The Russian-chartered plane arrived in Tripoli today at
1500 and is scheduled to depart Libya at 0500 local time on
December 21. DOE reports that all necessary overflight
clearances have been received. We will send another update
following the plane's departure.
CRETZ
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: The Swiss Charge in Tripoli, Stefano
Lazarrotto, expressed cautious optimism that the bilateral
crisis with Libya had seen measured improvements. On December
15, the GOL issued a visa to a Swiss diplomat assigned to work
in Tripoli, and in exchange, Switzerland issued a visa to a
Libyan diplomat assigned to work in Bern, as part of a "deal"
struck between the Charge and Libyan MFA.
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 001024
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SZ, LY
SUBJECT: HINTS OF MINOR PROGRESS IN THE SWISS-LIBYA STANDOFF
REF: TRIPOLI 942
TRIPOLI 00001024 001.2 OF 002
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) Summary: The Swiss Charge in Tripoli, Stefano
Lazarrotto, expressed cautious optimism that the bilateral
crisis with Libya had seen measured improvements. On December
15, the GOL issued a visa to a Swiss diplomat assigned to work
in Tripoli, and in exchange, Switzerland issued a visa to a
Libyan diplomat assigned to work in Bern, as part of a "deal"
struck between the Charge and Libyan MFA. Lazarrotto told us
that Switzerland was now pursuing a dual-track approach in an
attempt to resolve the crisis, a bilateral MFA dialogue based in
Bern and a new Tripoli-based dialogue with the Qadhafi
Development Foundation. The Libyan Government insists that a
third party (Austria, Germany, France, or Spain) mediate
discussions in both tracks. Although Lazarrotto no longer
expressed an immediate fear that he would be declared persona
non grata, he maintained his December 1 request that the Embassy
support the detained Swiss in the event that Swiss officials are
asked to leave the country. End summary.
POSITIVE SIGN BUT REQUEST FOR SUPPORT STANDS
2. (C) Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarrotto said that the GOL had
granted a visa to a Swiss diplomat who will be assigned to Libya
to serve as "Head of Chancery" (the *****alent of a Management
Officer). The diplomat arrived on December 19. Simultaneously,
the Swiss Government issued a visa to a Libyan diplomat assigned
to work at the Libyan Embassy in Bern. Lazarrotto said the
"deal" was struck after three weeks of negotiation on the issue.
3. (S/NF) Due to this positive development, Lazarrotto said the
Swiss were less concerned than they were a few weeks ago about
the possibility that the Charge would be asked to leave the
country for allowing the detained Swiss citizens, now sentenced
in a Libyan court, to continue to reside at the Swiss Embassy
(reftel). However, Lazarrotto noted that the request still
stands for possible U.S. assistance in providing food to the
detained Swiss in the event that the Swiss diplomats are
declared persona non grata. Lazarrotto also said the Swiss
Embassy had stockpiled food and water for the detainees, which
somewhat lessened the need for humanitarian assistance in the
event of further political difficulties. He said that he had
made the request for humanitarian assistance to several
embassies but that none had responded yet. Separately, the UK
Embassy told us on December 16 that they had received the Swiss
request but had not responded, and indicated that the UK
Government was unlikely to respond positively.
SWISS PURSUE DUAL TRACK STRATEGY
4. (C) Lazarrotto confirmed that an appeals trial was still
scheduled to take place on December 22 in the immigration court.
The Libyan lawyer working on the case is trying to clarify
whether the two men have to be present for the trial to take
place. Separately, the hearings before the "economic court,"
which handles tax issues and other matters, have been pushed
back to January 2, 2010 for Max Goeldi and to January 3, 2010
for Rashid Hamdani. The Swiss do not plan to attend. The
lawyer is still trying to obtain in writing the list of specific
charges.
5. (S/NF) The Swiss are now proceeding along two tracks to
negotiate a solution to the situation. The first track, being
led by the Swiss Government in Bern, consists of bilateral MFA
talks to reopen discussions on political reconciliation.
Lazarrotto reported that a Libyan MFA representative (the name
of whom he could not remember) traveled to Bern last week for
informal discussions of how to move forward. Libya is now
insisting that any formal discussions include a third country
"mediator." Bern agreed to allow Austria, Germany, France, or
Spain to serve as the third party, as those countries had
previously agreed to facilitate negotiations on behalf of the
Swiss.
6. (S/NF) The Swiss have initiated a second track recently,
through Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's Qadhafi Development
Foundation (QDF). Lazarrotto explained that the Libyan lawyer
representing the detained businessmen had approached the QDF to
intervene with the GOL on the issue, and that the QDF had also
insisted that a third party be involved in the discussions
(namely, one of the countries mentioned above). According to
Lazarrotto, Human Rights Watch met with the Swiss during the
group's recent visit to Tripoli and noted that in previous
discussions they had had with Saif al-Islam in London, Saif had
articulated his interested in "solving" the Swiss issue soon.
SWITZERLAND CONTINUES TO APPLY VETO POWER
TRIPOLI 00001024 002.2 OF 002
7. (S/NF) Lazarrotto said that he had faced pressure recently
from "a few EU embassies," regarding Switzerland's decision to
veto the issuance of Schengen visas to Qadhafi family members.
He specified that the Portuguese Ambassador (strictly protect)
had been particularly vocal in accusing Switzerland of abusing
its veto power. Lazarrotto defended his nation's stance,
stating "Imagine that this situation were to happen to another
Qadhafi family member? Switzerland could not afford that. It
is better that we take precautions." Lazarrotto stressed that
the veto policy was only being applied to Libyan officials and
Qadhafi family members -- "average Libyan citizens are still
able to apply for Swiss visas in Cairo," he said.
8. (S/NF) Comment: Lazarrotto's previous fears regarding his
status seem to have been greatly allayed by the GOL's issuance
of a visa for a Swiss diplomat assigned to work at the Swiss
Embassy. The introduction of EU mediating parties and a new
negotiating track under the auspices of the Qadhafi Development
Foundation strike us as positive developments though the Swiss
remain angered and frustrated by the Libyan refusal to state
what they truly want to settle the dispute once and for all. .
End comment.
CRETZ
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) On December 21 at 0515, a Russian-chartered plane
took off from Tripoli with the seven casks containing Libya's
final Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel stocks.
Department of Energy (DOE) staff in Tripoli confirmed that the
flight arrived in Russia at 11:15 local time.
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NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY
(ANDREW BIENIAWSKI, KELLY CUMMINS, AND SARAH DICKERSON).
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
TAGS: PREL, PINS, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG,
LY
SUBJECT: FINAL HEU SHIPMENT DEPARTS LIBYA
REF: A) TRIPOLI 938 B) TRIPOLI 966; C) TRIPOLI 941
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) On December 21 at 0515, a Russian-chartered plane
took off from Tripoli with the seven casks containing Libya's
final Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel stocks.
Department of Energy (DOE) staff in Tripoli confirmed that the
flight arrived in Russia at 11:15 local time. Today's flight
marked the successful completion of Libya's commitments to
dismantle its nuclear weapons programs.
2. (S/NF) Visiting DOE staff reported that the loading of the
casks the overnight on December 20-21 went smoothly. They said
that Libyan officials at Tajoura Nuclear Center provided no
insights into the reasons behind the GOL's last-minute decision
to cancel the planned November 25 shipment (ref a) or to put it
back on track via a letter to Russian authorities on December 15
(ref b). DOE staff said the month-long impasse had taken a
visible toll on Dr. Ali Gashut, the head of the Libyan Atomic
Energy Establishment. Gashut seemed "embarrassed" and
"different," and commented that he had spent a lot of time
"waiting in ministry halls," presumably as the GOL debated
policy options. The director of the Tajura Nuclear Center,
Engineer Ahmed al-Habrush, was personally present for the
loading of the casks and signed all the required documents for
handing over the HEU.
3. (S/NF) In reference to queries made by Saif al-Islam
al-Qadhafi regarding the disposition of Libya's centrifuges that
were handed over to the U.S. (Ref C), the DOE visitors noted
that any centrifuges that were sent to the U.S. were destroyed
and could not be could be returned to Libya in their original
form. If the Libyans were referring to other materiel, such as
high efficient machinery, some equipment was moved to the U.S.
and some was left in Libya to be used for peaceful purposes such
for medical uses.
4. (SNF) The Ambassador would like to thank the DOE team -
Kelly Cummins, Igor Bolshinsky, and Stan Moses - for their
efforts to resolve this issue. Their on-the-ground, expert
analysis ensured that the Embassy was fully apprised of all of
the technical details, and their clear explanation of the
complex timelines and constraints helped ensure a timely
resolution. We are very grateful for their work.
CRETZ
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Rumors persist that Libya is seeking an unprecedented
second consecutive term as African Union Chair, driven largely
by its continued "dinar diplomacy," much of it delivered by
personal envoys of Muammar al-Qadhafi. Recent gifts, both
public and discreet, to member states have been interpreted by
some diplomatic missions as part of an orchestrated campaign to
insert Libya into position above Malawi or its Southern Region
neighbors.
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RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6177
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S E C R E T TRIPOLI 001036
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019
TAGS: PREL, AU-1, AL-1, KPAL, MI, LY
SUBJECT: LOCAL DIPLOMATS BELIEVE LIBYA UNLIKELY TO PUSH HARD FOR
SECOND TERM AS AU CHAIR
REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2945
B. LILONGWE 690
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (S/NF) Rumors persist that Libya is seeking an unprecedented
second consecutive term as African Union Chair, driven largely
by its continued "dinar diplomacy," much of it delivered by
personal envoys of Muammar al-Qadhafi. Recent gifts, both
public and discreet, to member states have been interpreted by
some diplomatic missions as part of an orchestrated campaign to
insert Libya into position above Malawi or its Southern Region
neighbors. A series of head-of-state visits, a C-10 summit
(reportedly focused on UN reform) and the recent announcement of
a $250 thousand gift to the Ghanaian Foreign Ministry have added
fuel to the rumors. However, we have also learned that Malawi
-- next in line to chair the AU -- has not been moved by either
Libya or the other African states Libya has sought to influence
through its largesse.
2. (C) Diplomats from two North African embassies separately
told Poloff that they expected Libya's "donations" to continue
but that they did not expect Libya to make the coordinated push
for the Chairmanship that it did last year. Egyptian Poloff
commented that the Libyans already have "their plate full" with
the March 2010 Arab League summit, for which the government is
constructing opulent guest quarters and a new meeting hall in
Tripoli. He noted that while Libya cleared the way for its AU
candidacy last year through CEN-SAD coordination meetings,
several (un-named) CEN-SAD partners oppose a second term for
Qadhafi and that "it would be very difficult for Egypt to
support." He assessed that Libya's donations were "business as
usual" for Libyan diplomacy and likely represented a hedge
should the chairmanship become open, rather than a strong push
for a second term.
3. (C) The same contact assessed that Libya was continuing its
policy of cash donations to African countries in order to retain
good relations with countries that "hate" Qadhafi's leadership
of the AU. The Egyptian Poloff said he took rumors that Libya
intended to focus on Gaza and Fatah-Hamas reconciliation efforts
during its Arab League presidency as a sign that al-Qadhafi
preferred to change course instead of pushing forward an AU
agenda of immediate political union that had made little
progress despite two Libyan-controlled summits. (Hamas leader
Khalid Mashal was in Tripoli for consultations on December 20.)
The consensus among AU-member diplomats polled was that should
Malawi unexpectedly waiver due to Libyan pressure, that other
Southern Region states that were "fed up" with Qadhafi's
chairmanship would fill the gap, per regional rotation rules.
4. (C) Comment: Pan-African messages feature heavily in the
image al-Qadhafi has created for himself. State media outlets
append "President of the African Union" to his customary title
of "Leader of the Revolution" (and, less frequently "King of the
Traditional Kings of Africa"). On a personal level, it is
likely al-Qadhafi would like to retain that title; on a
practical level, it is unclear that Libya intends to pursue that
role vigorously given competing concerns. Rumors of Qadhafi's
plans for the AU chairmanship likely will persist barring a
strong statement from Malawi or another Southern Region member
affirming their intent to assume the chairmanship. We recommend
monitoring Libya's moves in both the AU and Arab League before
approaching high-level officials on al-Qadhafi's intentions, as
providing notice of our high-level interest may have unintended
consequences for both our bilateral and multilateral interests.
CRETZ
Excerpt from document
(C) The Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Libya, Dong
Hee Chang recently told the Ambassador that his country was
interested in advancing its civil nuclear cooperation with Libya
and wanted to know if the U.S. had any objections.
Full Document
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S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000008
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/7/2020
TAGS: PREL, PINS, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG,
LY, KS
SUBJECT: KOREA SEEKS U.S. VIEWS ON CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH
LIBYA
CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
1. (SBU) This is an action request; please see para 4.
2. (C) The Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Libya, Dong
Hee Chang recently told the Ambassador that his country was
interested in advancing its civil nuclear cooperation with Libya
and wanted to know if the U.S. had any objections. He said the
South Korean Embassy in Washington had broached this topic with
U.S. officials in Washington and had not received any reply.
(It is unclear which USG agency or office was contacted.)
Specifically, South Korea would like to provide nuclear reactors
for power generation to Libya. South Korea's Ambassador told
the Ambassador that any potential South Korean civil nuclear
cooperation with Libya would be fully coordinated with the IAEA.
3. (C) Over the last year, Libya has stepped up its civil
nuclear programs, signing agreements for similar cooperation
with France, Argentina, Canada, Ukraine and Russia. Senior
Libyan officials, including Muammar al-Qadhafi, have told us
that Libya seeks similar cooperation with the United States.
4. (S/NF) Comment and Action Request: We note that further
information on this proposal has been provided in other,
sensitive reporting. Department's guidance on South Korea's
proposed civil nuclear cooperation with Libya is requested.
CRETZ
Excerpt from document
(SBU) Visas Viper committee met on January 4, 2010. DCM,
POL/ECON, RAO, PAO, DAO, RSO, and CONS attended.
Full Document
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PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0018/01 0101501
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P 101501Z JAN 10
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RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5663
INFO RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1533
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6214
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000018
VISAS VIPER
NOFORN
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR CA/VO/L/C AND INR/TIPOFF
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/10/2035
TAGS: CVIS, KVPR, PTER, ASEC, CMGT, PINR, PREL, LY
SUBJECT: VISAS VIPER REPORT: NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 2009
CLASSIFIED BY: Yael Lempert, Consular Chief, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c)
1. (SBU) Visas Viper committee met on January 4, 2010. DCM,
POL/ECON, RAO, PAO, DAO, RSO, and CONS attended.
2. (S/NF) The following names were submitted. All are Libyan
citizens. Derogatory information on the below individuals was
submitted to us by the Libyan External Security Organization:
(names removed)
TRIPOLI 00000018 002 OF 002
Local check of Consolidated Consular Database indicates no
record. Recipients are requested to recheck CCD to verify.
CRETZ
«ويكيليكس»: الرياض اقترحت قوة عربية بدعم أطلسي لمواجهة حزب الله
هدوء قبل العاصفة في بيروت؟ (جوزف عيد - أ ف ب)آخر تحديث 1:03PM بتوقيت بيروت | خاص بالموقع
في جديد «ويكيليكس»، كشفت برقية مصنّفة «سرية» أنّ السعودية اقترحت قبل عامين تأليف قوة عربية تدعمها الولايات المتحدة وحلف شمالي الأطلسي للتدخل في لبنان والقضاء على حزب الله.
وبحسب صحيفة «ذا غارديان» البريطانية، فإن الاقتراح جاء من وزير الخارجية السعودي الأمير سعود الفيصل خلال لقاء جمعه بالسفير الأميركي في العراق، ديفيد ساترفيلد، بعد أيام فقط من أحداث 7 أيار 2008.
وشدد الفيصل على الحاجة إلى ما قال إنه «ردّ أمني» على «التحدي العسكري» الذي تواجهه حكومة لبنان من حزب الله. وتقول البرقية «حاجج سعود (الفيصل) على وجه التحديد، لتأليف القوة العربية من أجل إرساء النظام في بيروت وحولها».
الدولة اللبنانية احتفت بالأمير خالد الفيصل في بيروت اليوم (محمد عزاقير - رويترز)
وتابعت أن الوزير السعودي قال إن «على الولايات المتحدة وحلف الأطلسي توفير وسائل النقل والدعم اللوجستي فضلاً عن الغطاء البحري والجوي. وإن انتصار حزب الله في بيروت سيعني نهاية حكومة السنيورة واستيلاء الإيرانيين على لبنان».
وجاء في البرقية أن الفيصل جادل بأن انتصار حزب الله على حكومة السنيورة «إلى جانب الأعمال الإيرانية في العراق، وعلى الجبهة الفلسطينية سيكون كارثة بالنسبة إلى الولايات المتحدة والمنطقة بأسرها». وقال إن الوضع الحالي في بيروت «عسكري تماماً»، وإنّ الحل يجب أن يكون عسكرياً أيضاً، وإنّ الوضع يستدعي «قوة عربية من الدول العربية المحيطة للانتشار في بيروت تحت غطاء الأمم المتحدة».
وأكد الفيصل أن السنيورة دعم الفكرة بقوة، وأن البلدان العربية الوحيدة التي علمت بها كانت مصر والأردن، إلى جانب الأمين العام لجامعة الدول العربية عمرو موسى. وقال إن أية اتصالات لم تجر مع سوريا بشأن أيّ من التطورات في بيروت، مضيفاً «ما الحاجة إلى ذلك؟».
وأشار إلى أن من بين كل الجبهات الإقليمية التي كانت إيران تتقدم عليها، سيكون لبنان «معركة سهلة لانتصار» الحلفاء المعادين لإيران.
وخلص الأمير السعودي إلى التشديد على أن قوة لحفظ السلام من الأمم المتحدة والدول العربية، إضافةً إلى دعم جوي وبحري من الولايات المتحدة من شأنها «تحييد حزب الله إلى الأبد» في لبنان.
لكنّ ساترفيلد شكّك في الجدوى العسكرية والسياسية للخطة. رغم تأكيده أن الولايات المتحدة ستدرس أيّ قرار عربي.
(يو بي آي)
ويكيليكس: بريطانيا افرجت عن المقرحي تحت تهديدات اقتصادية لوح بها القذافي
كشف موقع ويكيليكس يوم الثلاثاء 7 ديسمبر/كانون الاول عن وثائق دبلوماسية أمريكية تقول ان الحكومة البريطانية أطلقت سراح الليبي عبد الباسط المقرحي المتهم بقضية لوكربي، بعد تهديدات لوح بها الزعيم الليبي معمر القذافي بتعليق كافة الاتفاقيات التجارية مع بريطانيا، فضلا عن تهديدات مبطنة للرعايا البريطانيين بليبيا، في حال وفاة المقرحي في السجن باسكتلندا.
وتقول الوثائق الدبلوماسية أن السلطات البريطانية خشيت على مصالحها الاقتصادية في ليبيا، وأيدت الافراج السريع عن المقرحي الذي كان يقضي عقوبة السجن بعد إدانته في حادث تفجير طائرة الركاب الأمريكية فوق بلدة لوكربي باسكتلندا عام 1988 وراح ضحيته 270 قتيلا معظمهم أمريكيون.
كما كشف موقع ويكيليكس عن برقية دبلوماسية أمريكية أخرى تقول ان التهديدات شملت المصالح الامريكية إذا ما أعربت واشنطن علنا عن معارضتها للافراج عن المقرحي، مشيرة الى احتمال تعرض السفارة الأمريكية والمواطنين الأمريكيين في ليبيا لعواقب مماثلة.
ونقل موقع "بي بي سي" الالكتروني عن مراسلات دبلوماسية أمريكية كشف عنها ويكيليكس أن السفير البريطاني لدى ليبيا قال لزميل دبلوماسي أمريكي إن الليبيين يمكنهم "قطع أرجلنا من الركبة"، في إشارة إلى احتمال تضرر المصالح البريطانية الكبيرة في ليبيا، وعلى الأخص النفطية منها.
وتبين تلك الوثائق أن الدبلوماسيين البريطانيين في ليبيا وضعوا خططا وإجراءات استباقية لاحتمال تعرضهم لاحتجاجات ومظاهرات معادية، وهيأوا أنفسهم لإخلاء السفارة، والابقاء فقط على الموظفين الاساسيين جدا.
وكان القضاء في اسكتلندا قد أفرج عن المقرحي في اب/ اغسطس 2009 لأسباب صحية بعدما شخص أطباء اصابته بسرطان متقدم، معتبرين انه لن يبقى على قيد الحياة سوى 3 أشهر تقريبا، ما أثار استنكارا شديدا في الولايات المتحدة، في حين كشفت برقية دبلوماسية أمريكية أخرى أن وزير العدل البريطاني انذاك جاك سترو قال لدبلوماسيين أمريكيين قبيل اطلاق سراح المقرحي انه "قد يبقى 5 سنوات على قيد الحياة".
ويكيليكس: منظومة الدرع الصاروخية الامريكية في اوروبا بامكانها التصدي لاكثر من الصوارخ الايرانية والسورية
نشرت صحيفة " الغارديان " اللندنية يوم 7 ديسمبر/كانون الاول وثيقة سربها "ويكيليكس" تقول ان منظومة الدرع الصاروخية الامريكية في اوروبا يمكنها التصدي لاهداف قادمة من ايران وسوريا، وعند الضرورة التصدي لاهداف اخرى. واعتمادا على هذه الوثائق تشير الصحيفة الى ان " ادارة الرئيس الامريكي باراك اوباما اخبرت بولندا ان المنظومة التي اقترحتها واشنطن والناتو والمخصصة لصد هجوم صاروخي من جانب ايران او سورية يمكن تكييفها لصد صواريخ منطلقة من اتجاهات اخرى ".
وتشير الصحيفة الى ان " وارسو وموسكو ستريان في هذه الملاحظة مايفيد ان منظومة الدرع الصاروخية يمكن ان تستخدم لردع روسيا، وهو ما يتعارض والتصريحات العلنية للغرب".
وزير الخارجية الاسترالي: الولايات المتحدة تتحمل المسؤولية عن تسريب المعلومات السرية وسنقدم دعما قنصليا لازما لاسانج
اكد وزير الخارجية الاسترالي كيفين راد في 8 ديسمبر/كانون الاول ان المسؤولية عن نشر وثائق دبلوماسية سرية على موقع "ويكيليكس" تقع على الولايات المتحدة وليس على مؤسسه جوليان اسانج.
وقال في حديث لوكالة "رويتر" ان الوضع الناشئ يطرح تساؤلات خطيرة بصدد كيفية ضمان الولايات المتحدة لامن المعلومات.
كما صرح راد في كلمة لقناة Channel – 7 المحلية ان الخارجية الاسترالية ستقدم دعما قنصليا لازما لمواطنها جوليان اسانج الموجود حاليا رهن الاحتجاز في بريطانيا. ويذكر ان القنصل العام الاسترالي في بريطانيا قد التقى اسانج واكد انه سيحصل كأي مواطن لبلاده على دعم في اطار التشريعات المتبعة.
من جانبها لم تستثن واشنطن امكانية توجيه اتهامات لمؤسس "ويكيليكس" اذ قال فيليب كرولي الناطق الرسمي باسم الخارجية الامريكية ان كل المسائل المتعلقة باعتقال اسانج ستحل بين بريطانيا والسويد ولا علاقة للولايات المتحدة بالقضية. واكد مع ذلك ان الولايات المتحدة تواصل التحقيق لمعرفة الضرر الذي الحقه الموقع بمصالح الولايات المتحدة والبلدان الاخرى. واكد ان الجانب الامريكي سيقدم اتهامات لاي شخص قام ، حسب رأي واشطن، بخرق القانون في القضية المعنية. واشار الى ان التحقيق الذي تجريه واشنطن يرمي الى ذلك بالذات.
وفي الوقت ذاته امتنع كرولي عن ذكر قانون او مادة قانونية يمكن ان توجه الاتهامات بموجبها الى اسانج مصرحا انه ليس حقوقيا. تايم" الامريكية تمنح اسانج لقب "شخصية العام"
فيما ذكرت مواقع الكترونية في الولايات المتحدة الامريكية ان اسبوعية "تايم" تنوي منح لقب "شخصية العام" لجوليان اسانج مؤسس موقع "ويكيليكس" الموجود حاليا رهن الاحتجاز في بريطانيا، ويمنح اللقب لشخص او مجموعة من الاشخاص الاكثر تأثيرا في الاحداث العالمية خلال السنة المعنية.
وسينظر في قضية اسانج في احدى المحاكم البريطانية يوم 14 ديسمبر/كانون الاول.
وقد منح هذا اللقب في العام الماضي لبن برنانكي رئيس الإحتياطي الفدرالي الأمريكي وفي عام 2008 لباراك اوباما وفي عام 2007 لفلاديمير بوتين.
ألمانيا لا تريد التخلي عن السلاح النووي بسبب روسيا
نشر موقع ويكيليكس الإلكتروني يوم 6 ديسمبر أسماء المنشآت الهامة ومكامن الثروات الطبيعية في الولايات المتحدة والعالم المدرجة على القائمة التي أعدتها وزارة الأمن الأمريكية في عام 2009.
وعلقت مجلة "شبيغيل" الألمانية على تسريبات ويكيليكس هذه قائلة إن الوثائق السرية كشفت أن السفارة الأمريكية مدت أيدي مخبريها إلى أنحاء ألمانيا كافة.
وتم كشف واحد من المخبرين اسمه هلموت ميتزنر، وهو رئيس مكتب زعيم الحزب الليبرالي الألماني. واعترف ميتزنر الذي أعفي من منصبه يوم الخميس الماضي بأنه زود السفارة الأمريكية بمعلومات تهم واشنطن.
وعلى سبيل المثال أخبر ميتزنر السفارة الأمريكية في خريف 2009 بأن زعيم الحزب الليبرالي فسترفيلي طالب المستشارة الألمانية ميركل بأن تبحث مع الحلفاء الأمريكان إجلاء القنابل النووية الأمريكية من ألمانيا.
وأقلق هذا الخبر واشنطن، فتوجهت وزارة الخارجية الأمريكية باستفسار إلى السيد كريستوف هويسغين، مستشار ميركل للشؤون الخارجية. وأهدأ الأخير بال الأمريكان بقوله إن موضوع السلاح النووي طرحه زعيم الحزب الليبرالي في حين أن الحكومة الألمانية لا ترى مبررا لإخلاء ألمانيا من قطع السلاح النووي التكتيكي العشرين المتبقية في وقت تملك روسيا فيه آلاف القطع.
وبعد نشر هذه المعلومات دعا البعض إلى طرد السفير الأمريكي من ألمانيا. إلا أن المتحدث الرسمي باسم المستشارة الألمانية ميركل أعلن أن الحكومة الألمانية لا تدعو إلى طرد السفير الأمريكي.
رد مع اقتباس
