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  1. #55
    (بين القوس == والهدف) الصورة الرمزية السهم
    تاريخ التسجيل
    Jul 2007
    المشاركات
    21,064




    09TRIPOLI942 Date01/12/2009 05:21 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (S/NF) Summary: The two detained Swiss citizens, now held in
    Libya for approximately 16 months, were each sentenced to16
    months in prison by a Libyan immigration court on November 30.
    According to Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto, the Swiss citizens,
    who were sentenced in absentia, most likely will not leave the
    embassy to attend hearings for tax-related violations, scheduled
    for December 5 and 6.


    Full Document
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    OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
    DE RUEHTRO #0942/01 3351721
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    O 011721Z DEC 09
    FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5514
    INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0054
    RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
    RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6064
    *******
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000942
    NOFORN
    SIPDIS
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/1/2019
    TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SZ, LY
    SUBJECT: LIBYAN IMMIGRATION COURT SENTENCES SWISS TO 16 MONTHS IN
    PRISON
    REF: A) TRIPOLI 900, B) TRIPOLI 901, C) TRIPOLI 910, D) BERN 504
    TRIPOLI 00000942 001.2 OF 002
    CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
    Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (S/NF) Summary: The two detained Swiss citizens, now held in
    Libya for approximately 16 months, were each sentenced to16
    months in prison by a Libyan immigration court on November 30.
    According to Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto, the Swiss citizens,
    who were sentenced in absentia, most likely will not leave the
    embassy to attend hearings for tax-related violations, scheduled
    for December 5 and 6. Concerned that the Libyans might up the
    ante and declare him persona non grata, Lazarotto requested
    December 1 that the U.S. Embassy provide material assistance to
    the detained Swiss if/if that were to occur. Lazarotto said he
    had been instructed by Bern to make the request of our embassy
    and several EU embassies in Tripoli. Given other sensitive
    issues currently pending on the bilateral agenda, we believe a
    visible U.S. role in assisting the Swiss could be highly
    detrimental to our own interests. Department's guidance is
    requested. End Summary.
    2. (C) Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto expressed his continued
    concern to Pol/Econ Chief November 30 about the welfare of the
    two detained Swiss citizens, who have not been allowed to the
    leave Libya for over 16 months. Earlier the same day, an
    immigration judge sentenced each of the two men, in absentia, to
    16 months in prison. Lazarotto related that the lawyer for the
    Swiss appeared before the court alone November 30, to request a
    formal statement of the immigration charges; the judge refused,
    claiming that the Swiss had appeared before his court shortly
    after their release from Libyan custody on November 9. The
    judge said he had heard their arguments at that time and had
    informed them that he would issue a sentence the following week.
    According to Lazarotto, the lawyer argued that to sentence the
    accused without a proper trial and without the presence of legal
    counsel, was a miscarriage of justice -- an argument that was
    lost on the judge. The Swiss have asked their lawyer to file an
    appeal to the decision.
    3. (C) Lazarotto said that the Swiss were prepared to appear
    before the court on November 30, but were advised by their
    lawyer not to go unless they were assured that a proper trial
    would take place. According to Lazarotto, three representatives
    of (unspecified) EU embassies were prepared to accompany the
    detained citizens to the trial. Lazarotto noted that three
    additional EU embassy officials had been "on standby." [Note: A
    UK political officer told poloff November 25 that the EU
    embassies had decided to send lower-level representation, if
    any, to the Swiss hearings, but that the decision to send a
    representative would be made by the individual embassies. End
    note.]
    4. (C) Given the sentence, the Swiss citizens most likely will
    not attend hearings before the tax court, scheduled for December
    5 and 6, although they have been provided with a copy of the
    tax-related charges held against them. Lazarotto noted that
    execution of the sentence would pose a threat to other foreign
    business interests in Libya, demonstrating that the GOL was
    willing to exact retribution on businesspeople in response to
    political disagreements. [Note: A few General Managers of U.S.
    companies operating in Libya recently expressed similar
    concerns. End note.]
    5. (S/NF) In a separate meeting on December 1, Lazarotto
    informed Pol/Econ Chief that he had been discussing with Bern
    the various worst-case scenarios that could come now that a
    sentence has been issued. He expressed his fear that the
    Libyans could declare him persona non grata if he did not hand
    the detained Swiss over to Libyan authorities, although he
    claimed that he had not been threatened in such a way.
    Lazarotto noted that in a meeting several weeks ago with the
    MFA, he was told that the GOL would do "anything" to make sure
    that the detained Swiss completed their sentences once verdicts
    were reached. Lazarotto was accused in the same meeting of
    trying to help the Swiss escape. Lazorotto continued that this
    hypothetical situation would remove the last Swiss diplomat from
    the country and would effectively force the detained citizens to
    leave the protection of the embassy premises when their food
    supply ran out. In order to protect the Swiss citizens,
    Lazarotto explained that Bern had instructed him to request
    third-country commitments of assistance to deliver food supplies
    and to monitor their health and well-being. He confided that he
    did not expect a single embassy to respond positively to the
    request. Pol/Econ Chief undertook to convey the request but did
    not offer any promises of assistance.
    6. (C) Lazarotto did not believe the Libyans were interested in
    moving forward with the bilateral relationship. Instead,
    Lazarotto surmised that the GOL was now focused on pressuring EU
    countries not to support the Swiss, rather than achieving a
    TRIPOLI 00000942 002.2 OF 002
    bilateral resolution. He explained that the EU ambassadors had
    been convened by the Foreign Minister November 29 to hear his
    complaints about Switzerland's continued use of its Schengen
    veto on Libyan visa applicants and how that would negatively
    affecting larger EU interests.
    7. (S/NF) Comment: The sentencing of the Swiss businessmen
    without trial underscores the serious shortcomings in Libya's
    judicial systems and will send a chilling warning to foreign
    investors. In the wake of this escalating, high-profile
    dispute, the Swiss-Libyan political relationship continues its
    downward spiral. The recent Swiss move to ban Libya from the
    World Economic Forum will not improve matters, and it is not
    outside of the realm of possibility that the Swiss Charge could
    be asked to leave the country. If/if the Swiss Charge is in
    fact PNG'ed, we believe that a direct USG role in providing
    assistance to the Swiss citizens could be detrimental to our own
    bilateral interests. Although we appreciate the gravity of the
    humanitarian situation, we believe a visible U.S. role in
    assisting the Swiss could undermine our efforts to resolve the
    outstanding HEU shipment. Department's guidance on the Swiss
    request for support is requested. End comment.
    POLASCHIK



    09TRIPOLI943 Date01/12/2009 05:28 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief met MFA Americas Acting A/S-*****alent
    Mohamed Matari December 1 to convey our serious concerns about
    the security of the seven HEU-filled casks at the Tajoura
    Nuclear Facility. Matari dismissed U.S. concerns, stating there
    was "no one sophisticated enough" in Libya to be able to do
    anything with the casks and that the chances of anything
    happening were very low.


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    OO RUEHTRO
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    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5516
    INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0102
    RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0087
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
    RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6066
    *******
    S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000943
    NOFORN
    SIPDIS
    STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY
    (KELLY CUMMINS AND SARAH DICKERSON).
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/1/2019
    TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG,
    LY
    SUBJECT: LIBYAN MFA BRIEFED ON HEU SECURITY CONCERNS
    REF: A) TRIPOLI 938, B) TRIPOLI 941
    CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
    Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief met MFA Americas Acting A/S-*****alent
    Mohamed Matari December 1 to convey our serious concerns about
    the security of the seven HEU-filled casks at the Tajoura
    Nuclear Facility. Matari dismissed U.S. concerns, stating there
    was "no one sophisticated enough" in Libya to be able to do
    anything with the casks and that the chances of anything
    happening were very low. He mentioned the IAEA seals as
    evidence that the fuel was protected (Ref A). Pol/Econ Chief
    underscored that the GOL should be concerned about the
    situation, as the casks were easily transportable and Tajoura
    was a poorly protected facility. U.S. DOE specialists had
    recommended an increased security guard presence -- armed if
    possible -- around Tajoura and the disengagement of the crane
    inside the facility. Pol/Econ Chief emphasized that the casks
    were easily transportable, and advised him not to be too
    dismissive of the security risks involved in keeping the casks
    unprotected. Matari said that he would meet with Foreign
    Minister Musa Kusa today to relay our concerns.
    2. (S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief also described the environmental
    disaster that could take place if we did not ship the casks to
    Russia for disposal within a month. The U.S. needed a decision
    from the Libyan side as soon as possible on the shipment, as it
    would take time to reschedule the travel of the specialized
    Russian plane, including overflight permits, landing permits,
    and negotiating with the Russian MFA to cancel other scheduled
    stops. Matari was not aware of how complicated it would be to
    schedule a return visit of the plane, although he understood
    that only a few such planes exist in the world. He said he
    agreed that a decision needed to be passed to us within a few
    weeks.
    3. (S/NF) Matari was not aware that Dr. Gashut claimed to have
    prepared a document for senior regime officials listing all of
    the environmental dangers associated with holding the shipment
    back. Matari said that Gashut probably gave the paper to Prime
    Mininster-*****alent al-Baghdad al-Mahmoudi (Gashut's boss) but
    did not think it had been passed to the MFA. (Matari may well
    have been unaware of any communications between Gashut and Kusa
    on this issue.) Matari promised to call us after he had briefed
    Kusa.
    4. (S/NF) We also are seeking a meeting with Saif al-Islam
    al-Qadhaif's aide Mohamed Ismail Ahmed to relay the same
    information, in hopes of ensuring that senior Libyan officials
    understand the grave security and safety risks posed by the
    halted shipment.
    POLASCHIK



    09TRIPOLI950 Date07/12/2009 04:14 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (S/NF) Summary: Visiting DOE experts confirmed December 6
    that the Libyan Government had taken the requisite steps to
    increase the security of the seven casks of HEU, and that the
    *******s -- and IAEA seals -- remained unchanged since the
    shipment was halted November 25.


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    VZCZCXRO9590
    OO RUEHTRO
    DE RUEHTRO #0950/01 3411614
    ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5524
    INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0088
    RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0103
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    RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
    RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
    RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6074
    *******
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000950
    NOFORN
    SIPDIS
    STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG.
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/7/2019
    TAGS: PREL, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG, LY
    SUBJECT: LIBYAN HEU SHIPMENT SECURE; NO DECISION YET REGARDING NEXT
    STEPS
    REF: A) TRIPOLI 938; B) TRIPOLI 941
    CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
    Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (S/NF) Summary: Visiting DOE experts confirmed December 6
    that the Libyan Government had taken the requisite steps to
    increase the security of the seven casks of HEU, and that the
    *******s -- and IAEA seals -- remained unchanged since the
    shipment was halted November 25. The Libyan Government has not
    yet provided guidance to its nuclear scientists regarding next
    steps on the shipment, but Libyan scientists are developing
    contingency plans to remove the HEU from the casks in Libya in
    the event the casks must be returned empty to Russia. DOE
    experts estimate that Libyan approval must be received by
    December 10 in order for the shipment to be completed by the end
    of December. Separately, a close aide to Saif al-Islam
    al-Qadhafi indicated that the Secretary's message to Libyan FM
    Musa Kusa had been positively received and passed to the
    "highest levels" of the Libyan Government. The aide also
    indicated that Kusa would call the Secretary in the "coming
    days" to assure her that the Libyan Government had approved the
    shipment. We continue to underscore with Libyan officials the
    need to resolve this issue. End summary.
    HEU CASKS SECURE, UNCHANGED
    2. (S/NF) Visiting DOE experts confirmed December 6 that the
    Libyan Government had taken the requisite steps to increase
    security at the Tajura Nuclear Facility, and that the seven
    casks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) appeared to have remained
    unchanged since the planned shipment to Russia was halted on
    November 25 (ref a). The DOE experts reported a visible
    increase in the number of armed guards surrounding the facility.
    They also confirmed that Tajura staff had disengaged the crane
    within the facility and had assured the team that a new,
    unassembled crane would not be built until after the shipment
    had taken place. DOE's measurements of the spent fuel within
    the casks determined that the ******* had remained unchanged.
    Likewise, the IAEA seals on each cask remained in place and
    uncompromised.
    NO DECISIONS
    3. (S/NF) The DOE team also reported that Libyan technical
    specialists at Tajura had not yet received guidance from the
    Libyan Government on next steps regarding the shipment. Dr. Ali
    Gashut, Head of Libya's Atomic Energy Establishment, confirmed
    this information in a December 7 telcon with the DOE team. The
    team also reported that although the Libyan Government had sent
    the Russian Government a diplomatic note confirming that the GOL
    would complete its contract to return the casks to Russia by the
    end of the calendar year, the note did not specify whether the
    casks would be returned empty or with the HEU spent fuel
    shipment. The DOE team assessed the diplomatic note as an
    attempt to mollify Russian demands that the casks be returned.
    POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS
    4. (S/NF) The DOE team estimated that the GOL must give its
    approval to move forward on the shipment by December 10 in order
    for the shipment to take place by the end of December. The DOE
    experts emphasized that significant lead time is required in
    order set up the necessary logistical arrangements, permits and
    overflight clearances for the specialized Russian plane to
    return to Tripoli and transport the HEU to Russia.
    5. (S/NF) The DOE team reported that Russian engineers had
    begun to design a remote-controlled grapple to be used in the
    event that the HEU spent fuel must be off-loaded from the casks
    in Libya. Tajura staff told the DOE experts that, if GOL
    approval for the shipment was not forthcoming by December 10,
    the Tajura staff planned to start training on how to use the
    grapple to off-load the casks. (According to DOE experts, spent
    nuclear fuel has never been removed from casks for restorage;
    the removal of the spent fuel in Libya would be an unprecedented
    initiative.) DOE experts also commented that the return of the
    empty casks to Russia, if necessary, would be best done by boat
    and said they are developing contingency plans for that
    scenario.
    POSITIVE FEEDBACK FROM THE SECRETARY'S CALL
    6. (S/NF) Separately, emboffs have attempted to seek
    clarification of the Libyan Government's next steps regarding
    the HEU shipment. Mohamed Ismail Ahmed, Chief of Staff of Saif
    al-Islam al-Qadhafi, told Pol/Econ Chief that the Secretary's
    December 3 call to Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa had
    expressed the statement of commitment requested by Saif during
    TRIPOLI 00000950 002 OF 002
    his recent meeting with the Ambassador (ref b), and that Kusa
    had passed the message to the "highest levels" of the Libyan
    Government. Ahmed emphasized that Saif had made a "commitment"
    to the Ambassador to ensure that the HEU shipment would be
    approved by the Libyan Government, and "Saif will follow-through
    on that commitment." Ahmed said Kusa intended to call the
    Secretary within the "coming days" in order to personally assure
    her that the GOL had approved the shipment. Emboffs also
    briefed Ahmed and MFA officials on the requisite timeline and
    lengthy logistical preparations needed to ensure the spent
    fuel's transfer to Russia by the end of the year.
    COMMENT
    7. (S/NF) Ahmed's comments indicate that the Secretary's
    message to Kusa was positively received. A flurry of phone
    calls between DOE and Libyan experts today also indicated that
    working-level Libyan officials are seeking more time to resolve
    the issue, as the Libyans successfully convinced the DOE experts
    to extend the deadline for a Libyan decision by two days, to
    December 10 (the initial deadline proposed by DOE was December
    8). At this point, we are interpreting the Libyan experts'
    technical preparations for a possible unloading of the casks in
    Libya as the contingency planning required to address the very
    real safety and security concerns raised by the halted shipment.
    We will reassess that view on December 10, and will continue to
    underscore with Libyan officials the need for a resolution of
    the issue this week.
    POLASCHIK










  2. #56
    https://forum.sh3bwah.maktoob.com/t300431.html


    09TRIPOLI955 Date09/12/2009 03:56 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (S/NF) Summary: Six leading members of the Libyan Islamic
    Fighting Group (LIFG) imprisoned in Libya recently issued a
    417-page document renouncing the use of violence and
    establishing a new "code" for jihad. The group includes LIFG's
    "founding fathers," individuals with ties to Al Qaeda in the
    Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) senior leadership, including the elder
    brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure.


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    OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW
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    DE RUEHTRO #0955/01 3431556
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    TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5530
    INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
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    RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6080
    *******
    S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000955
    NOFORN
    SIPDIS
    STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG.
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/8/2019
    TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, KISL, PHUM, LY
    SUBJECT: LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP REVISES JIHADIST IDEOLOGY
    REF: A) Tripoli 359; B) Tripoli 678
    TRIPOLI 00000955 001.2 OF 003
    CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
    Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (S/NF) Summary: Six leading members of the Libyan Islamic
    Fighting Group (LIFG) imprisoned in Libya recently issued a
    417-page document renouncing the use of violence and
    establishing a new "code" for jihad. The group includes LIFG's
    "founding fathers," individuals with ties to Al Qaeda in the
    Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) senior leadership, including the elder
    brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure. The
    recantation claims to represent a clearer understanding of the
    "ethics" of Islamic shari'a law and jihad and specifically
    refutes the LIFG's decades-long jihad against Muammar
    al-Qadhafi. The document is the result of a two-year initiative
    led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi through his Qadhafi
    International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF), and
    supported by Libya's internal and external security services.
    As a result of the initiative, more than 200 jihadists
    (approximately half of the imprisoned LIGF members) have been
    released from prison, with more releases expected soon. The
    initiative has been highlighted by local and international media
    as a potential model in counter-radicalization and touted by the
    Libyan government as a "revolutionary new method to combat
    terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the region." While
    Libya's terrorist rehabilitation program has drawn skepticism
    from some quarters, who view the recantation as coerced and
    politically motivated, the work is reportedly being reviewed by
    foreign governments and has received praise as a positive GOL
    contribution to regional counterterrorism efforts. While the
    initiative is significant for Libya's internal politics --
    simultaneously shoring up regime stability and Saif al-Islam's
    credentials -- its long-term effects as a counter-radicalization
    effort remain to be seen. End summary.
    SAIF AL-ISLAM AND LIBYAN SECURITY FORCES FACILITATE CODE,
    RELEASE OF LIFG
    2. (SBU) In late September, six leading members of the Libyan
    Islamic Fighting Group, being held in the Abu Salim prison,
    issued a document outlining a revised interpretation of their
    jihadist ideology -- one which renounces violence and claims to
    adhere to a more sound Islamic theology than that of Al Qaeda
    and other jihadist organizations. The authors represent the
    group's historic senior leadership, including Abd al-Hakim
    Balhaj (aka, Abu Abd Allah al-Sadiq, Emir of the LIFG), Abu
    al-Munder al-Saidi (Jurisprudence Official of the LIFG/most
    senior shari'a authority), Abd al-Wahab al-Qayed (the elder
    brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure), Khalid
    al-Sharif, Miftah al-Duwdi, and Mustafa Qanaifid. In the
    417-page, Arabic-language document, entitled "Revisionist
    Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Verification, and Judgment of
    People," the authors point to ignorance and a misinterpretation
    of Islamic jurisprudence as the basis for their formerly violent
    expression of Islamic jihad. The authors state that "The lack
    of religious knowledge, whether it was a result of an absence of
    'ulama' (religious scholars) or the neglect of people in
    receiving it and attaining it, or due to the absence of its
    sources, is the biggest cause of errors and religious
    violations." They credit a deep evaluation of their lives'
    experiences, coupled with a closer study of shari'a law for
    their ideological reform.
    3. (SBU) The study is characterized as an attempt to recant
    former LIFG doctrine and to establish a new "code" for jihad for
    the benefit of the modern Muslim community. In the text, the
    authors directly challenge Al Qaeda, addressing the recantation
    to "anyone who we might have once had organizational or
    brotherly ties with." The document gives detailed
    interpretations of the "ethics and morals to jihad," which
    include the rejection of violence as a means to change political
    situations in Muslim majority countries whose leader is a Muslim
    and condemns "the killing of women, children, the elderly,
    monks/priests, wage earners, messengers, merchants and the
    like." It claims that "The reduction of jihad to fighting with
    the sword is an error and shortcoming."
    4. (S/NF) The revised LIFG ideology is the result of a two-year
    initiative, led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi in his capacity as
    QDF chairman and brokered on behalf of the Libyan government.
    According to press reports and Libyan officials, Saif worked
    closely with the UK-based former LIFG leader, Noman Benotman, on
    the effort to work on a revised ideology with the LIFG in
    exchange for amnesty. QDF's lead negotiator, Salah Abdelsalam
    Salah, director of the QDF's Human Rights Committee, (who also
    heads Saif al-Islam's al-Ghad Media Group, ref A), said that he
    had met with al-Sadiq "4-5" times in 2007, before reconciliation
    TRIPOLI 00000955 002.2 OF 003
    discussions began in earnest. At that time, al-Sadiq seemed
    "ready to reconcile" and had indicated that his cohort shared
    his serious desire to break with their violent past.
    5. (S/NF) Salah detailed the two-year negotiation in a meeting
    with Pol/Econ Chief, sharing several handwritten letters from
    al-Sadiq to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, requesting assistance.
    After the initial communication, a series of meetings began,
    along two tracks: the first involving imprisoned LIFG
    leadership conversing with their members; the second involving
    LIFG leadership, the QDF, leading Islamic scholars, and prison
    officials (from Libya's Internal Security Organization).
    Libya's External Security Organization reportedly took on a
    supporting role, coordinating a "reconciliation and
    rehabilitation" movement among Libyan opposition figures
    (including LIFG members and others) living abroad. The meetings
    continued over the course of two years, and al-Sadiq wrote
    letters to Saif al-Islam throughout that period with updates on
    the LIFG position. In a letter dated January 16, 2009, al-Sadiq
    informed Saif of the LIFG's intention to draft the recantation
    work by August 1, 2009, to announce revisions to its jihadist
    ideology and to reconcile with the Libyan regime. On February
    23, 2009, al-Sadiq issued a press statement on behalf of the
    LIFG leaders in prison, announcing the continuation of a
    reconciliation dialogue with the QDF and GOL. Salah refused to
    comment on international press reports that Saif faced
    challenges from old guard regime officials who reportedly did
    not want to pardon the prisoners.
    6. (S/NF) As reported in ref B, QDF's Executive Director told us
    in August that the QDF had facilitated consultations between
    LIFG leadership and leading Islamic scholars, such as
    Qatar-based Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qardawi and Sheikh Ali
    Asalabi. In response to an early-2009 letter from al-Sadiq to
    Saif requesting by title a list of more than 10 books on Islamic
    jurisprudence, the QDF provided reading and reference materials
    for the LIFG to study in prison. On August 1, al-Sadiq informed
    Saif that the revisionist study was complete and submitted it
    for review.
    7. (S/NF) On August 23, to mark the beginning of Ramadan and the
    Libyan leader's 40th anniversary in power, LIFG leadership
    issued another press statement, this time apologizing to Muammar
    al-Qadhafi for their past acts of violence against him. The
    first of two rounds of prison releases took place shortly after
    the statement was published, with 91 LIFG prisoners pardoned and
    released. A second amnesty was announced in mid-October, with
    another 43 LIFG members reportedly being released. According to
    Salah, these releases constitute approximately half of the
    imprisoned LIFG members, all of whom were imprisoned at Abu
    Salim prison. (Saif al-Islam has publicly stated his intention
    to demolish the facility, infamous for a 1996 uprising that left
    1200 prisoners dead, after the last prisoners have been
    released.) Salah reported that another round of amnesties would
    take place in the coming weeks, with Saif's ultimate goal being
    100-percent prisoner release. In a separate effort, Salah said
    that the GOL has released some 62 members of other "jihadist
    groups" from Abu Salim prison based on their recantations of
    violent jihad.
    8. (S/NF) According to Salah, the revisionist study represented
    the dissolution of the LIFG organization in Libya. Upon
    release, each former LIFG member becomes a "regular" citizen and
    is allowed to "do what regular Libyans do," including
    unrestricted movement and the freedom to travel abroad. Salah
    vehemently denied the assertion among some analysts that the
    LIFG leaders reconciled due to lucrative incentive packages
    offered by the GOL. He claimed that the only benefits given to
    former LIFG prisoners upon release were "job training and
    employment assistance, financial support for medical care, if
    needed, and living expenses until the prisoners are able to find
    jobs." Some press reports indicate that as a condition of the
    pardon, former militants are required to pledge not to
    participate in Libyan politics, although they are able to speak
    in mosques. [Comment: Even if they wanted to participate in
    politics, how they would do so is unclear, given that political
    parties are outlawed in Libya. End comment.]
    9. (SBU) Saif al-Islam's involvement in the reconciliation
    effort has received widespread local and international media
    attention -- state-run print media has published excerpts of the
    text and praised Saif for his work, and CNN recently broadcast a
    feature report on the efforts. The CNN report praises the
    initiative, describing Saif's motivation as not only ending the
    TRIPOLI 00000955 003.2 OF 003
    violent movement against the regime but also combating Al
    Qaeda's "growing influence in the region." CNN further claimed
    that, "In essence the new code for jihad is exactly what the
    West has been waiting for: a credible challenge from within
    jihadist ranks to Al Qaeda's ideology." International
    think-tanks such as the Quilliam Foundation and Jihadica have
    analyzed the efforts and the LIFG document, with the latter
    calling it a "very sweeping repudiation not just of Salafi
    jihadism but of all forms of revolutionary Islamism in general."
    10. (C) Some observers believe the Libyan counter-radicalization
    experiment could be used as a model across the region and state
    that it differs from similar efforts, such as those in Saudi
    Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt in its methods and target audience.
    The September 17 edition of the US-based "Terrorism Monitor"
    credited the initiative's success to the "full institutional
    participation of the LIFG and its leadership," in the reform
    project. By contrast, the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni models, for
    example, relied on "the conversion of militant individuals who
    may remain drawn (willingly or otherwise) to their former
    organizations." In Egypt, the work of the Egyptian Islamic
    Jihad, while renouncing violence, maintained a fairly extreme
    ideology, propounded primarily by a single leader of the
    organization.
    11. (S/NF) The Libyan government proudly explained the efforts
    to reconcile with LIFG members during a September 6 meeting with
    NEA A/S Feltman. During the meeting, Director of Military
    Intelligence and Muammar al-Qadhafi confidante, Abdullah
    al-Sanussi, described the effort as a "revolutionary new method
    to combat terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the
    region," and presented a pre-published copy of the recantation
    study. UK diplomats have told us that the Libyans have also
    given them a copy of the work, which they are translating in
    full and analyzing as a possible model for
    counter-radicalization efforts. Other diplomats have praised
    the program as a positive GOL contribution to regional
    counterterrorism efforts.
    12. (S/NF) Amidst the positive international attention currently
    focused on Saif al-Islam's LIFG counter-radicalization program,
    some observers have expressed skepticism to emboffs about the
    project. One Western diplomat confided his personal view that
    the efforts were purely political and that even the Islamic
    scholars involved in the effort, such as Yusuf al-Qardawi, had
    political agendas. A number of private Libyan citizens agreed
    with the opinions expressed on some foreign-based blogs, that
    Libya's security organizations forced the LIFG leaders to write
    the recantation and that some LIFG members -- imprisoned in Abu
    Salim prison for decades -- were simply motivated by the
    prospect of pardon and the hope of reuniting with their
    families.
    COMMENT
    13. (S/NF) While local and international opinions are still
    being formulated on the initiative, the LIFG's renouncement of
    violent jihad and extremist ideology, and the document's direct
    challenge to Al Qaeda, represents a significant achievement for
    Saif al-Islam in particular and the Libyan government as a
    whole. The primary motivation for Muammar al-Qadhafi's backing
    of the initiative was undoubtedly regime security, and for Saif
    al-Islam, it may also have been political, designed to shore up
    his credentials both at home and abroad. We suspect that the
    Libyan Government may well have contributed significant
    resources in the form of "financial assistance" to help ensure
    that the newly released fighters maintain their end of the
    bargain. The GOL's immediate payoff on this investment is
    significant: the elimination of one of Qadhafi's most staunch
    opposition groups and a high-profile public relations coup in
    Libya's ongoing quest to position itself as a leader in the
    Islamic world. However, the long-term effects of the
    initiative, particularly with respect to the ideology of jihad
    and global counter-radicalization efforts, remains to be seen.
    POLASCHIK








    09TRIPOLI960 Date14/12/2009 09:05 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (S/NF) Summary: During recent meetings, Saif al-Islam
    al-Qadhafi's staff has shown an increased interest in bilateral
    military and security issues, particularly requests linked to
    Captain Khamis al-Qadhafi, including purchases of helicopters
    and "Tiger" vehicle components, and M113 refurbishment. Saif's
    staff also indicated Libya was interested in purchasing French
    SCALP cruise missiles to replace its SCUD Bs.


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    STATE FOR NEA/MAG
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019
    TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, KACT, MCAP, MASS, LY
    SUBJECT: SAIF AL-ISLAM'S STAFF REACHES OUT ON POL-MIL ISSUES
    REF: A) TRIPOLI 941; B) TRIPOLI 924; C) TRIPOLI 208
    TRIPOLI 00000960 001.2 OF 002
    CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
    Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (S/NF) Summary: During recent meetings, Saif al-Islam
    al-Qadhafi's staff has shown an increased interest in bilateral
    military and security issues, particularly requests linked to
    Captain Khamis al-Qadhafi, including purchases of helicopters
    and "Tiger" vehicle components, and M113 refurbishment. Saif's
    staff also indicated Libya was interested in purchasing French
    SCALP cruise missiles to replace its SCUD Bs. This increased
    attention may be reflective of Saif's broader plans to
    consolidate military and security issues within his expanding
    "General Coordinator" portfolio. Saif's staff declined to
    comment on any future division of responsibility between Saif
    al-Islam and Mutassim al-Qadhafi in these areas. The clear
    interest in military sales represented by Saif's staff on behalf
    of Khamis al-Qadhafi may be indicative of Saif's attempts to
    curry his youngest brother's favor. End Summary.
    SAIF'S AIDE ADVOCATES ON BEHALF OF KHAMIS
    2. (S/NF) During December 2 and 9 meetings with Pol/Econ Chief
    and DATT, Mohamed Ismail Ahmed, close aide to Saif al-Islam
    al-Qadhafi, expressed interest in military equipment sales,
    particularly purchase requests from Khamis al-Qadhafi's 32nd
    Brigade. Ahmed labeled "strange" the "broad" list of equipment
    requests made by National Security Advisor Mutassim al-Qadhafi
    to the Department of Defense earlier this year, and focused
    discussion on Libyan military requests for helicopters and
    vehicles -- requests that likely derived from the "Khamis
    Brigade." Ahmed sought an explanation on the USG refusal of the
    sale of Little Bird helicopters to the Libyan military, and
    designated for the "Khamis Brigade." Stating that the Libyan
    military was still very interested in purchasing the aircraft,
    he suggested the helicopters have all armament removed so they
    could be categorized as "non-lethal equipment." DATT informed
    him that the Libyan military was free to purchase a number of
    other helicopter systems that the Defense Security Cooperation
    Agency had already cleared for Libyan military purchase. Ahmed
    insisted that the Libyan military wanted to purchase the Little
    Bird helicopters.
    3. (S/NF) Additionally, Ahmed requested an update on the status
    of the license request by a jointly owned U.S. and Turkish
    company to refurbish Libya's fleet of M113 vehicles, in which
    Khamis al-Qadhafi had expressed a personal interest. He asked
    emboffs to provide him with a written update on the status of
    the request, which he would then pass to Khamis. Ahmed then
    reiterated a GOL complaint (which Saif had raised with the
    Ambassador on November 27, ref A) that a UAE company could not
    meet the requirements for the sale of a fleet of Jordanian
    "Tiger" 4x4 vehicles to the Libyan military, as the U.S.
    manufacturer of the vehicles' engines would not approve the
    sale. DATT informed Ahmed that, per discussions with the
    manufacturer, it was that company's policy, not U.S. law, that
    prohibited the sale of equipment to the Government of Libya.
    "We have a long way to go," retorted Ahmed. He stated that if
    the UAE could not outfit the Tiger vehicles with American
    engines, then the Libyans would purchase engines from
    Mercedes-Benz. "But we want American engines," he added. DATT
    extended the possibility that Libyan military procurement
    provide a Letter of Request to purchase the engines via the
    Foreign Military Sales process, which Ahmed said he would
    discuss with the appropriate officials.
    SAIF'S AIDE TO FOLLOW UP ON MILITARY ENGAGEMENT OFFERS
    4. (S/NF) In addition to the three issues raised, DATT educated
    Ahmed on the five pending Letters of Offer and Assistance (LOA)
    that have been held up in Libya's military procurement office
    for several months, all of which focus on C-130 related
    purchases and refurbishment requests, as well as the full range
    of military exchange and training opportunities that have been
    offered to the Libyans over the last year. While Ahmed did not
    show interest in the C-130 LOAs, he seemed surprised by the
    number of military exchange and training opportunities on offer
    and was particularly shocked that most of them had gone
    unanswered. "Who did you make these offers to?" he asked. He
    took particular interest in an offer made for Khamis to travel
    around the United States to tour U.S. military installations and
    pledged to follow-up directly with Khamis on that program.
    LIBYA POTENTIALLY IDENTIFIES SCUD B REPLACEMENT SYSTEM
    5. (S/NF) Separating the topic as one that was "political" as
    well as "military," Ahmed informed emboffs that the Libyans may
    have found an MTCR-compliant "replacement system" for its stock
    of SCUD B missiles. He explained that the GOL had discussed,
    TRIPOLI 00000960 002.2 OF 002
    during a recent high-level French visit, the purchase of the
    French SCALP Missile (a.k.a. "Storm Shadow") to replace the SCUD
    B. Ahmed asked whether the USG would consider the equipment
    MTCR-compliant, and if so, whether the USG would bless the sale.
    Emboffs offered to pass the information to Washington for
    guidance. "How soon do you think you will know?" he asked. We
    told him we would follow-up as soon as we had more information
    for him. (Note: The SCALP Missile is an air launched
    cruise-launched missile, fired from Rafale as well as other
    combat aircraft. From a separate source, DATT learned December
    10 that although France is keen to sell Rafale jets to Libya, it
    is not interested in selling the Libyans the SCALP Missile,
    which is deemed "too sensitive." End note.)
    SECURITY ROLE FOR SAIF?
    6. (S/NF) When asked whether Saif would be the point person for
    military and security issues if and when he takes on his new
    position as "General Coordinator," Ahmed advised -- after a long
    pause -- that the Embassy should continue to track
    military-related issues through Mutassim's office and to copy
    information to Saif's office (Ahmed) from now on.
    7. (S/NF) Comment: The concerted attention that Saif's close
    advisor devoted to military and security issues during recent
    meetings with Emboffs suggests that Saif is beginning to insert
    himself into the political-military and security spheres. The
    discussion of Khamis' requests in particular may indicate that
    Saif is trying to curry favor with his little brother. Given
    the fact that the "Khamis Brigade" is considered the
    best-equipped and most capable of defending the regime, it seems
    only natural that anyone intent on assuming power would try to
    align himself with Khamis. Ahmed's cautious advice to continue
    to track military and security issues through Mutassim's office
    seems to indicate that Saif's interest in these issues is still
    informal and perhaps not fully vetted within the Libyan
    government. End Comment.
    CRETZ








    09TRIPOLI966 Date15/12/2009 04:09 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (S/NF) The Russian Rosatom Agency reported to DOE officials
    today that it had received a letter from Libya's Tajoura Nuclear
    Research Center informing the Russians that the Libyan side had
    received the necessary approval to allow the shipment of Highly
    Enriched Uranium to proceed for transfer to Russia.


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    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2019
    TAGS: PREL, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG, LY
    SUBJECT: LIBYA HEU UPDATE: LETTER SENT TO RUSSIANS APPROVING
    SHIPMENT
    REF: TRIPOLI 950
    CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
    Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (S/NF) The Russian Rosatom Agency reported to DOE officials
    today that it had received a letter from Libya's Tajoura Nuclear
    Research Center informing the Russians that the Libyan side had
    received the necessary approval to allow the shipment of Highly
    Enriched Uranium to proceed for transfer to Russia. The full
    text of the letter is contained in para 2.
    2. (S) In a letter dated December 15, 2009, on the letterhead of
    Libya's Nuclear Energy Establishment, the Libyans wrote: "Dear
    Mr. Kazakov, FCNRS Director, With reference to your letter dated
    Dec. 14th, 2009, please be informed that the necessary license
    required for the shipment of the SNF [spent nuclear fuel] from
    Libya to Russia has been obtained. Hence, you are kindly asked
    to send the plane to Mitiga International Airport on the 20th of
    Dec. 2009 in accordance to the proposed schedule. Yours
    sincerely, Almhdi Gallab, Acting Director, Tajoura Nuclear
    Research Center."
    3. (S/NF) The Russian Embassy reported December 14 that it was
    processing the landing permits required for the specialized
    Russian plane to land at Mitiga Airport on December 20. If all
    proceeds according to the DOE and Rosatom schedule, the shipment
    should take place on December 21. DOE experts are scheduled to
    return to Libya on December 18.
    4. (S/NF) Comment: While the Libyan letter constitutes the
    first GOL action on this issue since the shipment was halted on
    November 25, we have not yet received confirmation from senior
    Libyan policy officials that the necessary approvals have been
    given. The Ambassador is seeking a meeting with Foreign Minister
    Musa Kusa to confirm this information.
    CRETZ




  3. #57
    https://forum.sh3bwah.maktoob.com/t300431.html


    09TRIPOLI955 Date09/12/2009 03:56 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (S/NF) Summary: Six leading members of the Libyan Islamic
    Fighting Group (LIFG) imprisoned in Libya recently issued a
    417-page document renouncing the use of violence and
    establishing a new "code" for jihad. The group includes LIFG's
    "founding fathers," individuals with ties to Al Qaeda in the
    Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) senior leadership, including the elder
    brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure.


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    TAGS: PREL, PTER, PGOV, KISL, PHUM, LY
    SUBJECT: LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP REVISES JIHADIST IDEOLOGY
    REF: A) Tripoli 359; B) Tripoli 678
    TRIPOLI 00000955 001.2 OF 003
    CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
    Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (S/NF) Summary: Six leading members of the Libyan Islamic
    Fighting Group (LIFG) imprisoned in Libya recently issued a
    417-page document renouncing the use of violence and
    establishing a new "code" for jihad. The group includes LIFG's
    "founding fathers," individuals with ties to Al Qaeda in the
    Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) senior leadership, including the elder
    brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure. The
    recantation claims to represent a clearer understanding of the
    "ethics" of Islamic shari'a law and jihad and specifically
    refutes the LIFG's decades-long jihad against Muammar
    al-Qadhafi. The document is the result of a two-year initiative
    led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi through his Qadhafi
    International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF), and
    supported by Libya's internal and external security services.
    As a result of the initiative, more than 200 jihadists
    (approximately half of the imprisoned LIGF members) have been
    released from prison, with more releases expected soon. The
    initiative has been highlighted by local and international media
    as a potential model in counter-radicalization and touted by the
    Libyan government as a "revolutionary new method to combat
    terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the region." While
    Libya's terrorist rehabilitation program has drawn skepticism
    from some quarters, who view the recantation as coerced and
    politically motivated, the work is reportedly being reviewed by
    foreign governments and has received praise as a positive GOL
    contribution to regional counterterrorism efforts. While the
    initiative is significant for Libya's internal politics --
    simultaneously shoring up regime stability and Saif al-Islam's
    credentials -- its long-term effects as a counter-radicalization
    effort remain to be seen. End summary.
    SAIF AL-ISLAM AND LIBYAN SECURITY FORCES FACILITATE CODE,
    RELEASE OF LIFG
    2. (SBU) In late September, six leading members of the Libyan
    Islamic Fighting Group, being held in the Abu Salim prison,
    issued a document outlining a revised interpretation of their
    jihadist ideology -- one which renounces violence and claims to
    adhere to a more sound Islamic theology than that of Al Qaeda
    and other jihadist organizations. The authors represent the
    group's historic senior leadership, including Abd al-Hakim
    Balhaj (aka, Abu Abd Allah al-Sadiq, Emir of the LIFG), Abu
    al-Munder al-Saidi (Jurisprudence Official of the LIFG/most
    senior shari'a authority), Abd al-Wahab al-Qayed (the elder
    brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure), Khalid
    al-Sharif, Miftah al-Duwdi, and Mustafa Qanaifid. In the
    417-page, Arabic-language document, entitled "Revisionist
    Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Verification, and Judgment of
    People," the authors point to ignorance and a misinterpretation
    of Islamic jurisprudence as the basis for their formerly violent
    expression of Islamic jihad. The authors state that "The lack
    of religious knowledge, whether it was a result of an absence of
    'ulama' (religious scholars) or the neglect of people in
    receiving it and attaining it, or due to the absence of its
    sources, is the biggest cause of errors and religious
    violations." They credit a deep evaluation of their lives'
    experiences, coupled with a closer study of shari'a law for
    their ideological reform.
    3. (SBU) The study is characterized as an attempt to recant
    former LIFG doctrine and to establish a new "code" for jihad for
    the benefit of the modern Muslim community. In the text, the
    authors directly challenge Al Qaeda, addressing the recantation
    to "anyone who we might have once had organizational or
    brotherly ties with." The document gives detailed
    interpretations of the "ethics and morals to jihad," which
    include the rejection of violence as a means to change political
    situations in Muslim majority countries whose leader is a Muslim
    and condemns "the killing of women, children, the elderly,
    monks/priests, wage earners, messengers, merchants and the
    like." It claims that "The reduction of jihad to fighting with
    the sword is an error and shortcoming."
    4. (S/NF) The revised LIFG ideology is the result of a two-year
    initiative, led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi in his capacity as
    QDF chairman and brokered on behalf of the Libyan government.
    According to press reports and Libyan officials, Saif worked
    closely with the UK-based former LIFG leader, Noman Benotman, on
    the effort to work on a revised ideology with the LIFG in
    exchange for amnesty. QDF's lead negotiator, Salah Abdelsalam
    Salah, director of the QDF's Human Rights Committee, (who also
    heads Saif al-Islam's al-Ghad Media Group, ref A), said that he
    had met with al-Sadiq "4-5" times in 2007, before reconciliation
    TRIPOLI 00000955 002.2 OF 003
    discussions began in earnest. At that time, al-Sadiq seemed
    "ready to reconcile" and had indicated that his cohort shared
    his serious desire to break with their violent past.
    5. (S/NF) Salah detailed the two-year negotiation in a meeting
    with Pol/Econ Chief, sharing several handwritten letters from
    al-Sadiq to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, requesting assistance.
    After the initial communication, a series of meetings began,
    along two tracks: the first involving imprisoned LIFG
    leadership conversing with their members; the second involving
    LIFG leadership, the QDF, leading Islamic scholars, and prison
    officials (from Libya's Internal Security Organization).
    Libya's External Security Organization reportedly took on a
    supporting role, coordinating a "reconciliation and
    rehabilitation" movement among Libyan opposition figures
    (including LIFG members and others) living abroad. The meetings
    continued over the course of two years, and al-Sadiq wrote
    letters to Saif al-Islam throughout that period with updates on
    the LIFG position. In a letter dated January 16, 2009, al-Sadiq
    informed Saif of the LIFG's intention to draft the recantation
    work by August 1, 2009, to announce revisions to its jihadist
    ideology and to reconcile with the Libyan regime. On February
    23, 2009, al-Sadiq issued a press statement on behalf of the
    LIFG leaders in prison, announcing the continuation of a
    reconciliation dialogue with the QDF and GOL. Salah refused to
    comment on international press reports that Saif faced
    challenges from old guard regime officials who reportedly did
    not want to pardon the prisoners.
    6. (S/NF) As reported in ref B, QDF's Executive Director told us
    in August that the QDF had facilitated consultations between
    LIFG leadership and leading Islamic scholars, such as
    Qatar-based Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qardawi and Sheikh Ali
    Asalabi. In response to an early-2009 letter from al-Sadiq to
    Saif requesting by title a list of more than 10 books on Islamic
    jurisprudence, the QDF provided reading and reference materials
    for the LIFG to study in prison. On August 1, al-Sadiq informed
    Saif that the revisionist study was complete and submitted it
    for review.
    7. (S/NF) On August 23, to mark the beginning of Ramadan and the
    Libyan leader's 40th anniversary in power, LIFG leadership
    issued another press statement, this time apologizing to Muammar
    al-Qadhafi for their past acts of violence against him. The
    first of two rounds of prison releases took place shortly after
    the statement was published, with 91 LIFG prisoners pardoned and
    released. A second amnesty was announced in mid-October, with
    another 43 LIFG members reportedly being released. According to
    Salah, these releases constitute approximately half of the
    imprisoned LIFG members, all of whom were imprisoned at Abu
    Salim prison. (Saif al-Islam has publicly stated his intention
    to demolish the facility, infamous for a 1996 uprising that left
    1200 prisoners dead, after the last prisoners have been
    released.) Salah reported that another round of amnesties would
    take place in the coming weeks, with Saif's ultimate goal being
    100-percent prisoner release. In a separate effort, Salah said
    that the GOL has released some 62 members of other "jihadist
    groups" from Abu Salim prison based on their recantations of
    violent jihad.
    8. (S/NF) According to Salah, the revisionist study represented
    the dissolution of the LIFG organization in Libya. Upon
    release, each former LIFG member becomes a "regular" citizen and
    is allowed to "do what regular Libyans do," including
    unrestricted movement and the freedom to travel abroad. Salah
    vehemently denied the assertion among some analysts that the
    LIFG leaders reconciled due to lucrative incentive packages
    offered by the GOL. He claimed that the only benefits given to
    former LIFG prisoners upon release were "job training and
    employment assistance, financial support for medical care, if
    needed, and living expenses until the prisoners are able to find
    jobs." Some press reports indicate that as a condition of the
    pardon, former militants are required to pledge not to
    participate in Libyan politics, although they are able to speak
    in mosques. [Comment: Even if they wanted to participate in
    politics, how they would do so is unclear, given that political
    parties are outlawed in Libya. End comment.]
    9. (SBU) Saif al-Islam's involvement in the reconciliation
    effort has received widespread local and international media
    attention -- state-run print media has published excerpts of the
    text and praised Saif for his work, and CNN recently broadcast a
    feature report on the efforts. The CNN report praises the
    initiative, describing Saif's motivation as not only ending the
    TRIPOLI 00000955 003.2 OF 003
    violent movement against the regime but also combating Al
    Qaeda's "growing influence in the region." CNN further claimed
    that, "In essence the new code for jihad is exactly what the
    West has been waiting for: a credible challenge from within
    jihadist ranks to Al Qaeda's ideology." International
    think-tanks such as the Quilliam Foundation and Jihadica have
    analyzed the efforts and the LIFG document, with the latter
    calling it a "very sweeping repudiation not just of Salafi
    jihadism but of all forms of revolutionary Islamism in general."
    10. (C) Some observers believe the Libyan counter-radicalization
    experiment could be used as a model across the region and state
    that it differs from similar efforts, such as those in Saudi
    Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt in its methods and target audience.
    The September 17 edition of the US-based "Terrorism Monitor"
    credited the initiative's success to the "full institutional
    participation of the LIFG and its leadership," in the reform
    project. By contrast, the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni models, for
    example, relied on "the conversion of militant individuals who
    may remain drawn (willingly or otherwise) to their former
    organizations." In Egypt, the work of the Egyptian Islamic
    Jihad, while renouncing violence, maintained a fairly extreme
    ideology, propounded primarily by a single leader of the
    organization.
    11. (S/NF) The Libyan government proudly explained the efforts
    to reconcile with LIFG members during a September 6 meeting with
    NEA A/S Feltman. During the meeting, Director of Military
    Intelligence and Muammar al-Qadhafi confidante, Abdullah
    al-Sanussi, described the effort as a "revolutionary new method
    to combat terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the
    region," and presented a pre-published copy of the recantation
    study. UK diplomats have told us that the Libyans have also
    given them a copy of the work, which they are translating in
    full and analyzing as a possible model for
    counter-radicalization efforts. Other diplomats have praised
    the program as a positive GOL contribution to regional
    counterterrorism efforts.
    12. (S/NF) Amidst the positive international attention currently
    focused on Saif al-Islam's LIFG counter-radicalization program,
    some observers have expressed skepticism to emboffs about the
    project. One Western diplomat confided his personal view that
    the efforts were purely political and that even the Islamic
    scholars involved in the effort, such as Yusuf al-Qardawi, had
    political agendas. A number of private Libyan citizens agreed
    with the opinions expressed on some foreign-based blogs, that
    Libya's security organizations forced the LIFG leaders to write
    the recantation and that some LIFG members -- imprisoned in Abu
    Salim prison for decades -- were simply motivated by the
    prospect of pardon and the hope of reuniting with their
    families.
    COMMENT
    13. (S/NF) While local and international opinions are still
    being formulated on the initiative, the LIFG's renouncement of
    violent jihad and extremist ideology, and the document's direct
    challenge to Al Qaeda, represents a significant achievement for
    Saif al-Islam in particular and the Libyan government as a
    whole. The primary motivation for Muammar al-Qadhafi's backing
    of the initiative was undoubtedly regime security, and for Saif
    al-Islam, it may also have been political, designed to shore up
    his credentials both at home and abroad. We suspect that the
    Libyan Government may well have contributed significant
    resources in the form of "financial assistance" to help ensure
    that the newly released fighters maintain their end of the
    bargain. The GOL's immediate payoff on this investment is
    significant: the elimination of one of Qadhafi's most staunch
    opposition groups and a high-profile public relations coup in
    Libya's ongoing quest to position itself as a leader in the
    Islamic world. However, the long-term effects of the
    initiative, particularly with respect to the ideology of jihad
    and global counter-radicalization efforts, remains to be seen.
    POLASCHIK








    09TRIPOLI960 Date14/12/2009 09:05 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (S/NF) Summary: During recent meetings, Saif al-Islam
    al-Qadhafi's staff has shown an increased interest in bilateral
    military and security issues, particularly requests linked to
    Captain Khamis al-Qadhafi, including purchases of helicopters
    and "Tiger" vehicle components, and M113 refurbishment. Saif's
    staff also indicated Libya was interested in purchasing French
    SCALP cruise missiles to replace its SCUD Bs.


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    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019
    TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINR, KACT, MCAP, MASS, LY
    SUBJECT: SAIF AL-ISLAM'S STAFF REACHES OUT ON POL-MIL ISSUES
    REF: A) TRIPOLI 941; B) TRIPOLI 924; C) TRIPOLI 208
    TRIPOLI 00000960 001.2 OF 002
    CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
    Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (S/NF) Summary: During recent meetings, Saif al-Islam
    al-Qadhafi's staff has shown an increased interest in bilateral
    military and security issues, particularly requests linked to
    Captain Khamis al-Qadhafi, including purchases of helicopters
    and "Tiger" vehicle components, and M113 refurbishment. Saif's
    staff also indicated Libya was interested in purchasing French
    SCALP cruise missiles to replace its SCUD Bs. This increased
    attention may be reflective of Saif's broader plans to
    consolidate military and security issues within his expanding
    "General Coordinator" portfolio. Saif's staff declined to
    comment on any future division of responsibility between Saif
    al-Islam and Mutassim al-Qadhafi in these areas. The clear
    interest in military sales represented by Saif's staff on behalf
    of Khamis al-Qadhafi may be indicative of Saif's attempts to
    curry his youngest brother's favor. End Summary.
    SAIF'S AIDE ADVOCATES ON BEHALF OF KHAMIS
    2. (S/NF) During December 2 and 9 meetings with Pol/Econ Chief
    and DATT, Mohamed Ismail Ahmed, close aide to Saif al-Islam
    al-Qadhafi, expressed interest in military equipment sales,
    particularly purchase requests from Khamis al-Qadhafi's 32nd
    Brigade. Ahmed labeled "strange" the "broad" list of equipment
    requests made by National Security Advisor Mutassim al-Qadhafi
    to the Department of Defense earlier this year, and focused
    discussion on Libyan military requests for helicopters and
    vehicles -- requests that likely derived from the "Khamis
    Brigade." Ahmed sought an explanation on the USG refusal of the
    sale of Little Bird helicopters to the Libyan military, and
    designated for the "Khamis Brigade." Stating that the Libyan
    military was still very interested in purchasing the aircraft,
    he suggested the helicopters have all armament removed so they
    could be categorized as "non-lethal equipment." DATT informed
    him that the Libyan military was free to purchase a number of
    other helicopter systems that the Defense Security Cooperation
    Agency had already cleared for Libyan military purchase. Ahmed
    insisted that the Libyan military wanted to purchase the Little
    Bird helicopters.
    3. (S/NF) Additionally, Ahmed requested an update on the status
    of the license request by a jointly owned U.S. and Turkish
    company to refurbish Libya's fleet of M113 vehicles, in which
    Khamis al-Qadhafi had expressed a personal interest. He asked
    emboffs to provide him with a written update on the status of
    the request, which he would then pass to Khamis. Ahmed then
    reiterated a GOL complaint (which Saif had raised with the
    Ambassador on November 27, ref A) that a UAE company could not
    meet the requirements for the sale of a fleet of Jordanian
    "Tiger" 4x4 vehicles to the Libyan military, as the U.S.
    manufacturer of the vehicles' engines would not approve the
    sale. DATT informed Ahmed that, per discussions with the
    manufacturer, it was that company's policy, not U.S. law, that
    prohibited the sale of equipment to the Government of Libya.
    "We have a long way to go," retorted Ahmed. He stated that if
    the UAE could not outfit the Tiger vehicles with American
    engines, then the Libyans would purchase engines from
    Mercedes-Benz. "But we want American engines," he added. DATT
    extended the possibility that Libyan military procurement
    provide a Letter of Request to purchase the engines via the
    Foreign Military Sales process, which Ahmed said he would
    discuss with the appropriate officials.
    SAIF'S AIDE TO FOLLOW UP ON MILITARY ENGAGEMENT OFFERS
    4. (S/NF) In addition to the three issues raised, DATT educated
    Ahmed on the five pending Letters of Offer and Assistance (LOA)
    that have been held up in Libya's military procurement office
    for several months, all of which focus on C-130 related
    purchases and refurbishment requests, as well as the full range
    of military exchange and training opportunities that have been
    offered to the Libyans over the last year. While Ahmed did not
    show interest in the C-130 LOAs, he seemed surprised by the
    number of military exchange and training opportunities on offer
    and was particularly shocked that most of them had gone
    unanswered. "Who did you make these offers to?" he asked. He
    took particular interest in an offer made for Khamis to travel
    around the United States to tour U.S. military installations and
    pledged to follow-up directly with Khamis on that program.
    LIBYA POTENTIALLY IDENTIFIES SCUD B REPLACEMENT SYSTEM
    5. (S/NF) Separating the topic as one that was "political" as
    well as "military," Ahmed informed emboffs that the Libyans may
    have found an MTCR-compliant "replacement system" for its stock
    of SCUD B missiles. He explained that the GOL had discussed,
    TRIPOLI 00000960 002.2 OF 002
    during a recent high-level French visit, the purchase of the
    French SCALP Missile (a.k.a. "Storm Shadow") to replace the SCUD
    B. Ahmed asked whether the USG would consider the equipment
    MTCR-compliant, and if so, whether the USG would bless the sale.
    Emboffs offered to pass the information to Washington for
    guidance. "How soon do you think you will know?" he asked. We
    told him we would follow-up as soon as we had more information
    for him. (Note: The SCALP Missile is an air launched
    cruise-launched missile, fired from Rafale as well as other
    combat aircraft. From a separate source, DATT learned December
    10 that although France is keen to sell Rafale jets to Libya, it
    is not interested in selling the Libyans the SCALP Missile,
    which is deemed "too sensitive." End note.)
    SECURITY ROLE FOR SAIF?
    6. (S/NF) When asked whether Saif would be the point person for
    military and security issues if and when he takes on his new
    position as "General Coordinator," Ahmed advised -- after a long
    pause -- that the Embassy should continue to track
    military-related issues through Mutassim's office and to copy
    information to Saif's office (Ahmed) from now on.
    7. (S/NF) Comment: The concerted attention that Saif's close
    advisor devoted to military and security issues during recent
    meetings with Emboffs suggests that Saif is beginning to insert
    himself into the political-military and security spheres. The
    discussion of Khamis' requests in particular may indicate that
    Saif is trying to curry favor with his little brother. Given
    the fact that the "Khamis Brigade" is considered the
    best-equipped and most capable of defending the regime, it seems
    only natural that anyone intent on assuming power would try to
    align himself with Khamis. Ahmed's cautious advice to continue
    to track military and security issues through Mutassim's office
    seems to indicate that Saif's interest in these issues is still
    informal and perhaps not fully vetted within the Libyan
    government. End Comment.
    CRETZ








    09TRIPOLI966 Date15/12/2009 04:09 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (S/NF) The Russian Rosatom Agency reported to DOE officials
    today that it had received a letter from Libya's Tajoura Nuclear
    Research Center informing the Russians that the Libyan side had
    received the necessary approval to allow the shipment of Highly
    Enriched Uranium to proceed for transfer to Russia.


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    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2019
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    SUBJECT: LIBYA HEU UPDATE: LETTER SENT TO RUSSIANS APPROVING
    SHIPMENT
    REF: TRIPOLI 950
    CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
    Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (S/NF) The Russian Rosatom Agency reported to DOE officials
    today that it had received a letter from Libya's Tajoura Nuclear
    Research Center informing the Russians that the Libyan side had
    received the necessary approval to allow the shipment of Highly
    Enriched Uranium to proceed for transfer to Russia. The full
    text of the letter is contained in para 2.
    2. (S) In a letter dated December 15, 2009, on the letterhead of
    Libya's Nuclear Energy Establishment, the Libyans wrote: "Dear
    Mr. Kazakov, FCNRS Director, With reference to your letter dated
    Dec. 14th, 2009, please be informed that the necessary license
    required for the shipment of the SNF [spent nuclear fuel] from
    Libya to Russia has been obtained. Hence, you are kindly asked
    to send the plane to Mitiga International Airport on the 20th of
    Dec. 2009 in accordance to the proposed schedule. Yours
    sincerely, Almhdi Gallab, Acting Director, Tajoura Nuclear
    Research Center."
    3. (S/NF) The Russian Embassy reported December 14 that it was
    processing the landing permits required for the specialized
    Russian plane to land at Mitiga Airport on December 20. If all
    proceeds according to the DOE and Rosatom schedule, the shipment
    should take place on December 21. DOE experts are scheduled to
    return to Libya on December 18.
    4. (S/NF) Comment: While the Libyan letter constitutes the
    first GOL action on this issue since the shipment was halted on
    November 25, we have not yet received confirmation from senior
    Libyan policy officials that the necessary approvals have been
    given. The Ambassador is seeking a meeting with Foreign Minister
    Musa Kusa to confirm this information.
    CRETZ




  4. #58



    Excerpt from document

    (C) Summary: Human Right Watch's December 12 launch of its


    latest report on Libya -- the first such launch in-country --


    provided an unprecedented public forum for discussion of Libya's


    past abuses. The event degenerated into a shouting match


    between regime critics and supporters, some of which appears to


    have been scripted.





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    TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PREL, LY


    SUBJECT: HRW RELEASES REPORT FROM TRIPOLI AT LIVELY MEETING


    CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,


    U.S. Department of State.


    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)


    1. (C) Summary: Human Right Watch's December 12 launch of its


    latest report on Libya -- the first such launch in-country --


    provided an unprecedented public forum for discussion of Libya's


    past abuses. The event degenerated into a shouting match


    between regime critics and supporters, some of which appears to


    have been scripted. HRW officials credited Saif al-Islam


    al-Qadhafi as key to the event, stating that his personal


    involvement prompted them to move them the event from Cairo and


    enabled the families of several victims of the Qadhafi regime's


    abuses to travel from Benghazi to the event. HRW told us


    privately that Justice Secretary Mustafa Abduljalil is a


    proponent of rule of law, and urged the USG to provide technical


    support for Libya's new draft criminal code, for which HRW


    already has provided 30 pages of comments. We believe this


    proposal is worthy of further consideration, particularly under


    the auspices of our bilateral Human Rights Dialogue. End Summary.


    2. (C) Representatives from Human Rights Watch (HRW) credited


    members of the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) for the


    latter's "brave and risky" facilitation of an event in Tripoli


    launching the rights group's first comprehensive report on Libya


    since 2006. The December 12 press conference brought members of


    the Libyan and international press together with relatives of


    past victims of Libyan human rights abuses -- and members of


    Libya's powerful security forces. While HRW staff recognized


    the historical and political significance of launching the


    report from Tripoli, they were careful not to overstate its


    importance or make assumptions on what it would mean for


    resolving outstanding human rights issues. Tom Malinowski,


    director of HRW's Washington office, told Poloff that the QDF's


    release of a similar report on December 10 was likely designed


    to reduce the sting of HRW's report by giving a national voice


    to human rights recommendations. Despite Saif al-Islam's


    positive intervention, authorities detained at least five


    families of the 1996 Abu Salim prison riot on their way from


    Benghazi to the event and denied visas for Washington Post and


    New York Times journalists to attend the HRW's press conference.


    3. (S//NF) A phone call from Muammar al-Qadhafi's staff putting


    HRW on notice for a possible audience with the Libyan leader


    thirty minutes before the scheduled start of the press


    conference nearly caused a last-minute cancellation, but the


    event began with only minor technical complications. The crowd


    was twice as large as HRW expected, with approximately 80


    journalists, diplomats, and government critics in the room. At


    least four security agents took notes, photos, and film of the


    proceedings; the primary cameraman had served as poloff's


    assigned surveillant for nearly six months. HRW briefly


    outlined its report, citing improvements on freedom of


    expression and the increased willingness of some public


    officials to accept and act on criticism. They acknowledged


    that many of Libya's major cases stem from events many years


    old, but that their concerns related to those cases would remain


    until victims and their relatives were given full accounts of


    and received justice for past violations. Thanking the QDF for


    its facilitation of both their study tour in April and the


    in-country launch of the report -- a fact that put Libya ahead


    of many other Arab states -- they also took so-called reformers


    to task for not doing enough to codify and institutionalize


    progress on human rights that has so far been won with support


    from Saif al-Islam and members of his inner circle.


    4. (C) The short briefing and recommendations were followed by a


    lively question-and-answer segment that quickly degenerated into


    a litany of grievances against the Internal Security


    Organization (ISO) for years of repression. A family member of


    a victim of the Abu Salim riot, holding a photo of his dead


    brother, described his brother's case in detail claiming the


    family had taken food and clothing to the prison for 13 years,


    until they received a death certificate this spring that lacked


    a cause of death. A woman from Benghazi asked whether HRW would


    apply pressure on the GOL to prosecute the director of an


    orphanage accused of sexually abusing girls under his care.


    Journalists and security agents swarmed those who spoke, some of


    whom were flanked by known employees of the QDF.


    5. (C) After several longer testimonies, a journalist from state


    news agency JANA spoke, claiming to have accepted government


    compensation for his brother's death at Abu Salim. He railed


    against HRW and those continuing to petition the government for


    justice on past abuses as "anti-Libyan" and denounced HRW for


    TRIPOLI 00001021 002 OF 003


    holding Libya to different standards than the rest of the world.


    He asked how HRW's report could even be written when abuses


    like "the war in Iraq, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo" went


    unpunished. He defended Libya's actions as necessary to keep


    the country safe, and noted that no attacks like 9/11 could


    occur on Libyan soil due to these protections. HRW reiterated


    its non-governmental and politically neutral status, and pointed


    out that it had been the first organization to report on alleged


    abuses at Abu Ghraib. While HRW's explanation appeared to calm


    some in the audience, his statements ended what appeared to be a


    carefully scripted piece of theater. The next speakers, only


    some of whom seemed to be at the event at the invitation of the


    QDF, made more vocal complaints on the deaths or disappearances


    of relatives and made specific claims against the ISO.


    6. (C) The event quickly evolved into an angry shouting match


    between government supporters and a sizable group of Libyan


    citizens urging the creation of compensation and truth


    commissions. The pro-government crowd, taunted by members of


    the audience as ISO agents, verbally attacked the HRW and their


    detractors, causing several individuals from both sides to storm


    out. After this public catharsis had endured for over 90


    minutes and with no further questions about the ******* of the


    report, HRW ended the press conference and spoke individually


    with several government critics. (Notably, the actual events


    differed from a Times of London report, which exaggerated the


    details of the role of GOL security officials in "shutting down"


    the press conference.) Watching from the parking lot, emboffs


    observed several of the most vocal government critics entering a


    large van with staff from the QDF unhindered by security agents.


    Others, including a lawyer claiming to have represented Idriss


    Bufayed, departed individually without apparent incident.


    7. (C/NF) In a December 13 meeting, HRW staff told the


    Ambassador that Saif al-Islam had personally intervened to allow


    the group to launch the report from Tripoli and that his


    influence had led to unprecedented access and openness from both


    high-ranking Libyan officials and ordinary citizens. HRW moved


    the planned launch from Cairo to Tripoli in mid-November at Saif


    al-Islam's encouragement, and the QDF facilitated meetings and


    visas for HRW. Contrasting their experience with their first


    visit in 2005, they remarked that everyone from lawyers to ISO


    director al-Tuhamy Khalid spoke more freely about Libya's human


    rights culture and no longer "cited chapter and verse of the


    Green Book." Malinowski assessed that a stalemate between


    "law-and-order" officials like Justice Secretary Mustafa


    Abduljalil and security officials like Khalid would make further


    progress on human rights difficult. Recounting a two-hour


    "philosophical debate" with Khalid, Malinowski said the ISO


    Chief recognized he was operating his organization outside the


    law by holding some 330 prisoners who had been acquitted or


    served their sentences, but justified his inaction on the


    grounds of national security and Libya's fight against terror.


    Khalid ended his meeting with HRW by telling them, "There are


    some criminals who don't deserve human rights. Other than that


    you and I agree on everything."


    8. (C/NF) HRW recommended that the U.S. support those elements


    of Libyan society that sought to institutionalize human rights


    protections. They see Abduljalil as a proud nationalist who


    believes in the principles of justice and the primacy of law and


    chalks up Libya's fitful march toward human rights legitimacy as


    "birthing pains" of a nation that is just reentering


    international society. Abduljalil told HRW that he would


    continue to fight against the culture of corruption that allowed


    security services to operate above the law. HRW sees the draft


    criminal code -- written under the QDF umbrella -- as a key, yet


    still insufficient part, of institutionalizing human rights


    protections within the Libyan legal structure. They provided


    post and the QDF with 30 pages of recommendations on the draft


    law -- which has been circulating for at least three years --


    that would bring Libya's penal code in line with international


    human rights norms, and suggested that U.S. technical experts


    play a role in finalizing the draft code, through the provision


    of technical assistance. While they recognize that change will


    come slowly in Libya's security organizations, HRW said that


    U.S. security officials might be able to deliver messages to the


    ESO and ISO on the long-term (in) effectiveness of aggressive


    detention and questioning policies. To help insulate Libya's


    fledgling progress from the whims of its personality-driven


    political system, HRW advised that enshrining human rights


    TRIPOLI 00001021 003 OF 003


    protections into the law and its application will be fundamental


    to real societal change.


    9. (C) Comment: Press reports on the tensions between security


    officers and regime critics at the HRW launch event were


    overstated. Most of the proceedings, including some of the


    back-and-forth between victims' families and security officials,


    seemed to follow a script that exalted the work of Saif al-Islam


    but remained carefully within the "red lines" that would cause


    significant offense. Although known security agents


    photographed and videotaped the event, and some families were


    detained for a short time and ordered not to travel from


    Benghazi to Tripoli, there are no reports that security


    officials took punitive action against regime critics.


    10. (C) Comment continued: This event -- the first-ever of its


    kind in Libya -- helped solidify Saif al-Islam's reputation as a


    "reformer" and also undoubtedly pushed the envelope with some


    Old Guard elements. The draft criminal code strikes us as an


    interesting opportunity for real reform in Libya. It is


    encouraging that the Libyan Government is engaged in a dialogue


    with HRW on the specifics of the draft legislation, and we


    believe that HRW's suggestion that the USG consider providing


    technical assistance merits further review. The draft criminal


    code, including our providing the background to U.S.


    jurisprudence handling of free speech, assembly, and criticism


    of public officials, could be good topics of discussion for the


    working groups that will be convened under the auspices of our


    Human Rights Dialogue. End Comment.


    CRETZ




    9TRIPOLI1022 Date20/12/2009 03:06 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (S/NF) After raising a sensitive proposal on another topic
    (septel) during their hastily-called late Friday evening
    meeting, and only in response to the Ambassador's insistence
    that the HEU issue be raised, Foreign Minister Musa Kusa told
    the Ambassador on December 18 that there would be "no problem"
    regarding the planned December 21 transfer to Russia of Libya's
    remaining Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel.


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    DICKERSON)
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019
    TAGS: PREL, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG, LY
    SUBJECT: LIBYA HEU UPDATE
    REF: TRIPOLI 966
    CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
    U.S. Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (S/NF) After raising a sensitive proposal on another topic
    (septel) during their hastily-called late Friday evening
    meeting, and only in response to the Ambassador's insistence
    that the HEU issue be raised, Foreign Minister Musa Kusa told
    the Ambassador on December 18 that there would be "no problem"
    regarding the planned December 21 transfer to Russia of Libya's
    remaining Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel. The
    Ambassador underscored the urgency of this issue to the
    bilateral relationship, noting that the Secretary, NEA A/S and
    National Security Advisor had been engaged in seeking a
    resolution. He wanted to ensure that Kusa was aware of the
    imminent December 18 deadline for the U.S. to either commit or
    withdraw its 800,000 USD financial obligation for contracting
    for the Russian plane. The Ambassador told Kusa that once the
    spent fuel transfer is successfully completed, the U.S. would be
    in a better position to discuss moving ahead on the full range
    of the bilateral relationship, including the several issues
    raised by Kusa in his December 3 conversation with the
    Secretary. At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador handed
    over the letter discussed by the NEA A/S and Kusa on December 12
    to ensure that the U.S. had done everything to effect completion
    of the mission.
    2. (S/NF) Separately, the DOE team visited the Tajoura Nuclear
    Center on December 19 and 20, and reported that all necessary
    preparations were underway for the shipment to take place on
    December 21. The team's Libyan counterparts said they had
    received all necessary approvals from the Libyan government.
    The spent fuel casks will be loaded into shipping containers
    today and transported from Tajoura to Mitiga Air Base later this
    evening. The Russian-chartered plane arrived in Tripoli today at
    1500 and is scheduled to depart Libya at 0500 local time on
    December 21. DOE reports that all necessary overflight
    clearances have been received. We will send another update
    following the plane's departure.
    CRETZ




    09TRIPOLI1024 Date21/12/2009 03:04 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (S/NF) Summary: The Swiss Charge in Tripoli, Stefano
    Lazarrotto, expressed cautious optimism that the bilateral
    crisis with Libya had seen measured improvements. On December
    15, the GOL issued a visa to a Swiss diplomat assigned to work
    in Tripoli, and in exchange, Switzerland issued a visa to a
    Libyan diplomat assigned to work in Bern, as part of a "deal"
    struck between the Charge and Libyan MFA.


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    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
    TAGS: PREL, PHUM, SZ, LY
    SUBJECT: HINTS OF MINOR PROGRESS IN THE SWISS-LIBYA STANDOFF
    REF: TRIPOLI 942
    TRIPOLI 00001024 001.2 OF 002
    CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
    U.S. Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (S/NF) Summary: The Swiss Charge in Tripoli, Stefano
    Lazarrotto, expressed cautious optimism that the bilateral
    crisis with Libya had seen measured improvements. On December
    15, the GOL issued a visa to a Swiss diplomat assigned to work
    in Tripoli, and in exchange, Switzerland issued a visa to a
    Libyan diplomat assigned to work in Bern, as part of a "deal"
    struck between the Charge and Libyan MFA. Lazarrotto told us
    that Switzerland was now pursuing a dual-track approach in an
    attempt to resolve the crisis, a bilateral MFA dialogue based in
    Bern and a new Tripoli-based dialogue with the Qadhafi
    Development Foundation. The Libyan Government insists that a
    third party (Austria, Germany, France, or Spain) mediate
    discussions in both tracks. Although Lazarrotto no longer
    expressed an immediate fear that he would be declared persona
    non grata, he maintained his December 1 request that the Embassy
    support the detained Swiss in the event that Swiss officials are
    asked to leave the country. End summary.
    POSITIVE SIGN BUT REQUEST FOR SUPPORT STANDS
    2. (C) Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarrotto said that the GOL had
    granted a visa to a Swiss diplomat who will be assigned to Libya
    to serve as "Head of Chancery" (the *****alent of a Management
    Officer). The diplomat arrived on December 19. Simultaneously,
    the Swiss Government issued a visa to a Libyan diplomat assigned
    to work at the Libyan Embassy in Bern. Lazarrotto said the
    "deal" was struck after three weeks of negotiation on the issue.
    3. (S/NF) Due to this positive development, Lazarrotto said the
    Swiss were less concerned than they were a few weeks ago about
    the possibility that the Charge would be asked to leave the
    country for allowing the detained Swiss citizens, now sentenced
    in a Libyan court, to continue to reside at the Swiss Embassy
    (reftel). However, Lazarrotto noted that the request still
    stands for possible U.S. assistance in providing food to the
    detained Swiss in the event that the Swiss diplomats are
    declared persona non grata. Lazarrotto also said the Swiss
    Embassy had stockpiled food and water for the detainees, which
    somewhat lessened the need for humanitarian assistance in the
    event of further political difficulties. He said that he had
    made the request for humanitarian assistance to several
    embassies but that none had responded yet. Separately, the UK
    Embassy told us on December 16 that they had received the Swiss
    request but had not responded, and indicated that the UK
    Government was unlikely to respond positively.
    SWISS PURSUE DUAL TRACK STRATEGY
    4. (C) Lazarrotto confirmed that an appeals trial was still
    scheduled to take place on December 22 in the immigration court.
    The Libyan lawyer working on the case is trying to clarify
    whether the two men have to be present for the trial to take
    place. Separately, the hearings before the "economic court,"
    which handles tax issues and other matters, have been pushed
    back to January 2, 2010 for Max Goeldi and to January 3, 2010
    for Rashid Hamdani. The Swiss do not plan to attend. The
    lawyer is still trying to obtain in writing the list of specific
    charges.
    5. (S/NF) The Swiss are now proceeding along two tracks to
    negotiate a solution to the situation. The first track, being
    led by the Swiss Government in Bern, consists of bilateral MFA
    talks to reopen discussions on political reconciliation.
    Lazarrotto reported that a Libyan MFA representative (the name
    of whom he could not remember) traveled to Bern last week for
    informal discussions of how to move forward. Libya is now
    insisting that any formal discussions include a third country
    "mediator." Bern agreed to allow Austria, Germany, France, or
    Spain to serve as the third party, as those countries had
    previously agreed to facilitate negotiations on behalf of the
    Swiss.
    6. (S/NF) The Swiss have initiated a second track recently,
    through Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's Qadhafi Development
    Foundation (QDF). Lazarrotto explained that the Libyan lawyer
    representing the detained businessmen had approached the QDF to
    intervene with the GOL on the issue, and that the QDF had also
    insisted that a third party be involved in the discussions
    (namely, one of the countries mentioned above). According to
    Lazarrotto, Human Rights Watch met with the Swiss during the
    group's recent visit to Tripoli and noted that in previous
    discussions they had had with Saif al-Islam in London, Saif had
    articulated his interested in "solving" the Swiss issue soon.
    SWITZERLAND CONTINUES TO APPLY VETO POWER
    TRIPOLI 00001024 002.2 OF 002
    7. (S/NF) Lazarrotto said that he had faced pressure recently
    from "a few EU embassies," regarding Switzerland's decision to
    veto the issuance of Schengen visas to Qadhafi family members.
    He specified that the Portuguese Ambassador (strictly protect)
    had been particularly vocal in accusing Switzerland of abusing
    its veto power. Lazarrotto defended his nation's stance,
    stating "Imagine that this situation were to happen to another
    Qadhafi family member? Switzerland could not afford that. It
    is better that we take precautions." Lazarrotto stressed that
    the veto policy was only being applied to Libyan officials and
    Qadhafi family members -- "average Libyan citizens are still
    able to apply for Swiss visas in Cairo," he said.
    8. (S/NF) Comment: Lazarrotto's previous fears regarding his
    status seem to have been greatly allayed by the GOL's issuance
    of a visa for a Swiss diplomat assigned to work at the Swiss
    Embassy. The introduction of EU mediating parties and a new
    negotiating track under the auspices of the Qadhafi Development
    Foundation strike us as positive developments though the Swiss
    remain angered and frustrated by the Libyan refusal to state
    what they truly want to settle the dispute once and for all. .
    End comment.
    CRETZ




  5. #59
    09TRIPOLI1025 Date21/12/2009 04:26 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (S/NF) On December 21 at 0515, a Russian-chartered plane
    took off from Tripoli with the seven casks containing Libya's
    final Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel stocks.
    Department of Energy (DOE) staff in Tripoli confirmed that the
    flight arrived in Russia at 11:15 local time.


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    (ANDREW BIENIAWSKI, KELLY CUMMINS, AND SARAH DICKERSON).
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2019
    TAGS: PREL, PINS, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG,
    LY
    SUBJECT: FINAL HEU SHIPMENT DEPARTS LIBYA
    REF: A) TRIPOLI 938 B) TRIPOLI 966; C) TRIPOLI 941
    CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
    U.S. Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (S/NF) On December 21 at 0515, a Russian-chartered plane
    took off from Tripoli with the seven casks containing Libya's
    final Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel stocks.
    Department of Energy (DOE) staff in Tripoli confirmed that the
    flight arrived in Russia at 11:15 local time. Today's flight
    marked the successful completion of Libya's commitments to
    dismantle its nuclear weapons programs.
    2. (S/NF) Visiting DOE staff reported that the loading of the
    casks the overnight on December 20-21 went smoothly. They said
    that Libyan officials at Tajoura Nuclear Center provided no
    insights into the reasons behind the GOL's last-minute decision
    to cancel the planned November 25 shipment (ref a) or to put it
    back on track via a letter to Russian authorities on December 15
    (ref b). DOE staff said the month-long impasse had taken a
    visible toll on Dr. Ali Gashut, the head of the Libyan Atomic
    Energy Establishment. Gashut seemed "embarrassed" and
    "different," and commented that he had spent a lot of time
    "waiting in ministry halls," presumably as the GOL debated
    policy options. The director of the Tajura Nuclear Center,
    Engineer Ahmed al-Habrush, was personally present for the
    loading of the casks and signed all the required documents for
    handing over the HEU.
    3. (S/NF) In reference to queries made by Saif al-Islam
    al-Qadhafi regarding the disposition of Libya's centrifuges that
    were handed over to the U.S. (Ref C), the DOE visitors noted
    that any centrifuges that were sent to the U.S. were destroyed
    and could not be could be returned to Libya in their original
    form. If the Libyans were referring to other materiel, such as
    high efficient machinery, some equipment was moved to the U.S.
    and some was left in Libya to be used for peaceful purposes such
    for medical uses.
    4. (SNF) The Ambassador would like to thank the DOE team -
    Kelly Cummins, Igor Bolshinsky, and Stan Moses - for their
    efforts to resolve this issue. Their on-the-ground, expert
    analysis ensured that the Embassy was fully apprised of all of
    the technical details, and their clear explanation of the
    complex timelines and constraints helped ensure a timely
    resolution. We are very grateful for their work.
    CRETZ





    09TRIPOLI1036 Date23/12/2009 09:46 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (S/NF) Rumors persist that Libya is seeking an unprecedented
    second consecutive term as African Union Chair, driven largely
    by its continued "dinar diplomacy," much of it delivered by
    personal envoys of Muammar al-Qadhafi. Recent gifts, both
    public and discreet, to member states have been interpreted by
    some diplomatic missions as part of an orchestrated campaign to
    insert Libya into position above Malawi or its Southern Region
    neighbors.


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    E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019
    TAGS: PREL, AU-1, AL-1, KPAL, MI, LY
    SUBJECT: LOCAL DIPLOMATS BELIEVE LIBYA UNLIKELY TO PUSH HARD FOR
    SECOND TERM AS AU CHAIR
    REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2945
    B. LILONGWE 690
    CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli,
    Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (S/NF) Rumors persist that Libya is seeking an unprecedented
    second consecutive term as African Union Chair, driven largely
    by its continued "dinar diplomacy," much of it delivered by
    personal envoys of Muammar al-Qadhafi. Recent gifts, both
    public and discreet, to member states have been interpreted by
    some diplomatic missions as part of an orchestrated campaign to
    insert Libya into position above Malawi or its Southern Region
    neighbors. A series of head-of-state visits, a C-10 summit
    (reportedly focused on UN reform) and the recent announcement of
    a $250 thousand gift to the Ghanaian Foreign Ministry have added
    fuel to the rumors. However, we have also learned that Malawi
    -- next in line to chair the AU -- has not been moved by either
    Libya or the other African states Libya has sought to influence
    through its largesse.
    2. (C) Diplomats from two North African embassies separately
    told Poloff that they expected Libya's "donations" to continue
    but that they did not expect Libya to make the coordinated push
    for the Chairmanship that it did last year. Egyptian Poloff
    commented that the Libyans already have "their plate full" with
    the March 2010 Arab League summit, for which the government is
    constructing opulent guest quarters and a new meeting hall in
    Tripoli. He noted that while Libya cleared the way for its AU
    candidacy last year through CEN-SAD coordination meetings,
    several (un-named) CEN-SAD partners oppose a second term for
    Qadhafi and that "it would be very difficult for Egypt to
    support." He assessed that Libya's donations were "business as
    usual" for Libyan diplomacy and likely represented a hedge
    should the chairmanship become open, rather than a strong push
    for a second term.
    3. (C) The same contact assessed that Libya was continuing its
    policy of cash donations to African countries in order to retain
    good relations with countries that "hate" Qadhafi's leadership
    of the AU. The Egyptian Poloff said he took rumors that Libya
    intended to focus on Gaza and Fatah-Hamas reconciliation efforts
    during its Arab League presidency as a sign that al-Qadhafi
    preferred to change course instead of pushing forward an AU
    agenda of immediate political union that had made little
    progress despite two Libyan-controlled summits. (Hamas leader
    Khalid Mashal was in Tripoli for consultations on December 20.)
    The consensus among AU-member diplomats polled was that should
    Malawi unexpectedly waiver due to Libyan pressure, that other
    Southern Region states that were "fed up" with Qadhafi's
    chairmanship would fill the gap, per regional rotation rules.
    4. (C) Comment: Pan-African messages feature heavily in the
    image al-Qadhafi has created for himself. State media outlets
    append "President of the African Union" to his customary title
    of "Leader of the Revolution" (and, less frequently "King of the
    Traditional Kings of Africa"). On a personal level, it is
    likely al-Qadhafi would like to retain that title; on a
    practical level, it is unclear that Libya intends to pursue that
    role vigorously given competing concerns. Rumors of Qadhafi's
    plans for the AU chairmanship likely will persist barring a
    strong statement from Malawi or another Southern Region member
    affirming their intent to assume the chairmanship. We recommend
    monitoring Libya's moves in both the AU and Arab League before
    approaching high-level officials on al-Qadhafi's intentions, as
    providing notice of our high-level interest may have unintended
    consequences for both our bilateral and multilateral interests.
    CRETZ






    10TRIPOLI8 Date07/01/2010 03:16 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (C) The Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Libya, Dong
    Hee Chang recently told the Ambassador that his country was
    interested in advancing its civil nuclear cooperation with Libya
    and wanted to know if the U.S. had any objections.


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    DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/7/2020
    TAGS: PREL, PINS, MNUC, PARM, PINR, RS, KGIC, KNNP, KRAD, ENRG,
    LY, KS
    SUBJECT: KOREA SEEKS U.S. VIEWS ON CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH
    LIBYA
    CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
    U.S. Department of State.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
    1. (SBU) This is an action request; please see para 4.
    2. (C) The Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Libya, Dong
    Hee Chang recently told the Ambassador that his country was
    interested in advancing its civil nuclear cooperation with Libya
    and wanted to know if the U.S. had any objections. He said the
    South Korean Embassy in Washington had broached this topic with
    U.S. officials in Washington and had not received any reply.
    (It is unclear which USG agency or office was contacted.)
    Specifically, South Korea would like to provide nuclear reactors
    for power generation to Libya. South Korea's Ambassador told
    the Ambassador that any potential South Korean civil nuclear
    cooperation with Libya would be fully coordinated with the IAEA.
    3. (C) Over the last year, Libya has stepped up its civil
    nuclear programs, signing agreements for similar cooperation
    with France, Argentina, Canada, Ukraine and Russia. Senior
    Libyan officials, including Muammar al-Qadhafi, have told us
    that Libya seeks similar cooperation with the United States.
    4. (S/NF) Comment and Action Request: We note that further
    information on this proposal has been provided in other,
    sensitive reporting. Department's guidance on South Korea's
    proposed civil nuclear cooperation with Libya is requested.
    CRETZ





    10TRIPOLI18 Date10/01/2010 03:01 OriginEmbassy Tripoli


    Excerpt from document
    (SBU) Visas Viper committee met on January 4, 2010. DCM,
    POL/ECON, RAO, PAO, DAO, RSO, and CONS attended.


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    SIPDIS
    DEPT FOR CA/VO/L/C AND INR/TIPOFF
    E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/10/2035
    TAGS: CVIS, KVPR, PTER, ASEC, CMGT, PINR, PREL, LY
    SUBJECT: VISAS VIPER REPORT: NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 2009
    CLASSIFIED BY: Yael Lempert, Consular Chief, U.S. Embassy
    Tripoli.
    REASON: 1.4 (b), (c)
    1. (SBU) Visas Viper committee met on January 4, 2010. DCM,
    POL/ECON, RAO, PAO, DAO, RSO, and CONS attended.
    2. (S/NF) The following names were submitted. All are Libyan
    citizens. Derogatory information on the below individuals was
    submitted to us by the Libyan External Security Organization:
    (names removed)
    TRIPOLI 00000018 002 OF 002
    Local check of Consolidated Consular Database indicates no
    record. Recipients are requested to recheck CCD to verify.
    CRETZ










  6. #60
    «ويكيليكس»: الرياض اقترحت قوة عربية بدعم أطلسي لمواجهة حزب الله



    هدوء قبل العاصفة في بيروت؟ (جوزف عيد - أ ف ب)آخر تحديث 1:03PM بتوقيت بيروت | خاص بالموقع
    في جديد «ويكيليكس»، كشفت برقية مصنّفة «سرية» أنّ السعودية اقترحت قبل عامين تأليف قوة عربية تدعمها الولايات المتحدة وحلف شمالي الأطلسي للتدخل في لبنان والقضاء على حزب الله.
    وبحسب صحيفة «ذا غارديان» البريطانية، فإن الاقتراح جاء من وزير الخارجية السعودي الأمير سعود الفيصل خلال لقاء جمعه بالسفير الأميركي في العراق، ديفيد ساترفيلد، بعد أيام فقط من أحداث 7 أيار 2008.
    وشدد الفيصل على الحاجة إلى ما قال إنه «ردّ أمني» على «التحدي العسكري» الذي تواجهه حكومة لبنان من حزب الله. وتقول البرقية «حاجج سعود (الفيصل) على وجه التحديد، لتأليف القوة العربية من أجل إرساء النظام في بيروت وحولها».

    الدولة اللبنانية احتفت بالأمير خالد الفيصل في بيروت اليوم (محمد عزاقير - رويترز)
    وتابعت أن الوزير السعودي قال إن «على الولايات المتحدة وحلف الأطلسي توفير وسائل النقل والدعم اللوجستي فضلاً عن الغطاء البحري والجوي. وإن انتصار حزب الله في بيروت سيعني نهاية حكومة السنيورة واستيلاء الإيرانيين على لبنان».
    وجاء في البرقية أن الفيصل جادل بأن انتصار حزب الله على حكومة السنيورة «إلى جانب الأعمال الإيرانية في العراق، وعلى الجبهة الفلسطينية سيكون كارثة بالنسبة إلى الولايات المتحدة والمنطقة بأسرها». وقال إن الوضع الحالي في بيروت «عسكري تماماً»، وإنّ الحل يجب أن يكون عسكرياً أيضاً، وإنّ الوضع يستدعي «قوة عربية من الدول العربية المحيطة للانتشار في بيروت تحت غطاء الأمم المتحدة».
    وأكد الفيصل أن السنيورة دعم الفكرة بقوة، وأن البلدان العربية الوحيدة التي علمت بها كانت مصر والأردن، إلى جانب الأمين العام لجامعة الدول العربية عمرو موسى. وقال إن أية اتصالات لم تجر مع سوريا بشأن أيّ من التطورات في بيروت، مضيفاً «ما الحاجة إلى ذلك؟».
    وأشار إلى أن من بين كل الجبهات الإقليمية التي كانت إيران تتقدم عليها، سيكون لبنان «معركة سهلة لانتصار» الحلفاء المعادين لإيران.
    وخلص الأمير السعودي إلى التشديد على أن قوة لحفظ السلام من الأمم المتحدة والدول العربية، إضافةً إلى دعم جوي وبحري من الولايات المتحدة من شأنها «تحييد حزب الله إلى الأبد» في لبنان.
    لكنّ ساترفيلد شكّك في الجدوى العسكرية والسياسية للخطة. رغم تأكيده أن الولايات المتحدة ستدرس أيّ قرار عربي.
    (يو بي آي)




    ويكيليكس: بريطانيا افرجت عن المقرحي تحت تهديدات اقتصادية لوح بها القذافي

    كشف موقع ويكيليكس يوم الثلاثاء 7 ديسمبر/كانون الاول عن وثائق دبلوماسية أمريكية تقول ان الحكومة البريطانية أطلقت سراح الليبي عبد الباسط المقرحي المتهم بقضية لوكربي، بعد تهديدات لوح بها الزعيم الليبي معمر القذافي بتعليق كافة الاتفاقيات التجارية مع بريطانيا، فضلا عن تهديدات مبطنة للرعايا البريطانيين بليبيا، في حال وفاة المقرحي في السجن باسكتلندا.
    وتقول الوثائق الدبلوماسية أن السلطات البريطانية خشيت على مصالحها الاقتصادية في ليبيا، وأيدت الافراج السريع عن المقرحي الذي كان يقضي عقوبة السجن بعد إدانته في حادث تفجير طائرة الركاب الأمريكية فوق بلدة لوكربي باسكتلندا عام 1988 وراح ضحيته 270 قتيلا معظمهم أمريكيون.
    كما كشف موقع ويكيليكس عن برقية دبلوماسية أمريكية أخرى تقول ان التهديدات شملت المصالح الامريكية إذا ما أعربت واشنطن علنا عن معارضتها للافراج عن المقرحي، مشيرة الى احتمال تعرض السفارة الأمريكية والمواطنين الأمريكيين في ليبيا لعواقب مماثلة.
    ونقل موقع "بي بي سي" الالكتروني عن مراسلات دبلوماسية أمريكية كشف عنها ويكيليكس أن السفير البريطاني لدى ليبيا قال لزميل دبلوماسي أمريكي إن الليبيين يمكنهم "قطع أرجلنا من الركبة"، في إشارة إلى احتمال تضرر المصالح البريطانية الكبيرة في ليبيا، وعلى الأخص النفطية منها.
    وتبين تلك الوثائق أن الدبلوماسيين البريطانيين في ليبيا وضعوا خططا وإجراءات استباقية لاحتمال تعرضهم لاحتجاجات ومظاهرات معادية، وهيأوا أنفسهم لإخلاء السفارة، والابقاء فقط على الموظفين الاساسيين جدا.
    وكان القضاء في اسكتلندا قد أفرج عن المقرحي في اب/ اغسطس 2009 لأسباب صحية بعدما شخص أطباء اصابته بسرطان متقدم، معتبرين انه لن يبقى على قيد الحياة سوى 3 أشهر تقريبا، ما أثار استنكارا شديدا في الولايات المتحدة، في حين كشفت برقية دبلوماسية أمريكية أخرى أن وزير العدل البريطاني انذاك جاك سترو قال لدبلوماسيين أمريكيين قبيل اطلاق سراح المقرحي انه "قد يبقى 5 سنوات على قيد الحياة".



    ويكيليكس: منظومة الدرع الصاروخية الامريكية في اوروبا بامكانها التصدي لاكثر من الصوارخ الايرانية والسورية


    نشرت صحيفة " الغارديان " اللندنية يوم 7 ديسمبر/كانون الاول وثيقة سربها "ويكيليكس" تقول ان منظومة الدرع الصاروخية الامريكية في اوروبا يمكنها التصدي لاهداف قادمة من ايران وسوريا، وعند الضرورة التصدي لاهداف اخرى. واعتمادا على هذه الوثائق تشير الصحيفة الى ان " ادارة الرئيس الامريكي باراك اوباما اخبرت بولندا ان المنظومة التي اقترحتها واشنطن والناتو والمخصصة لصد هجوم صاروخي من جانب ايران او سورية يمكن تكييفها لصد صواريخ منطلقة من اتجاهات اخرى ".

    وتشير الصحيفة الى ان " وارسو وموسكو ستريان في هذه الملاحظة مايفيد ان منظومة الدرع الصاروخية يمكن ان تستخدم لردع روسيا، وهو ما يتعارض والتصريحات العلنية للغرب".



    وزير الخارجية الاسترالي: الولايات المتحدة تتحمل المسؤولية عن تسريب المعلومات السرية وسنقدم دعما قنصليا لازما لاسانج


    اكد وزير الخارجية الاسترالي كيفين راد في 8 ديسمبر/كانون الاول ان المسؤولية عن نشر وثائق دبلوماسية سرية على موقع "ويكيليكس" تقع على الولايات المتحدة وليس على مؤسسه جوليان اسانج.

    وقال في حديث لوكالة "رويتر" ان الوضع الناشئ يطرح تساؤلات خطيرة بصدد كيفية ضمان الولايات المتحدة لامن المعلومات.

    كما صرح راد في كلمة لقناة Channel – 7 المحلية ان الخارجية الاسترالية ستقدم دعما قنصليا لازما لمواطنها جوليان اسانج الموجود حاليا رهن الاحتجاز في بريطانيا. ويذكر ان القنصل العام الاسترالي في بريطانيا قد التقى اسانج واكد انه سيحصل كأي مواطن لبلاده على دعم في اطار التشريعات المتبعة.

    من جانبها لم تستثن واشنطن امكانية توجيه اتهامات لمؤسس "ويكيليكس" اذ قال فيليب كرولي الناطق الرسمي باسم الخارجية الامريكية ان كل المسائل المتعلقة باعتقال اسانج ستحل بين بريطانيا والسويد ولا علاقة للولايات المتحدة بالقضية. واكد مع ذلك ان الولايات المتحدة تواصل التحقيق لمعرفة الضرر الذي الحقه الموقع بمصالح الولايات المتحدة والبلدان الاخرى. واكد ان الجانب الامريكي سيقدم اتهامات لاي شخص قام ، حسب رأي واشطن، بخرق القانون في القضية المعنية. واشار الى ان التحقيق الذي تجريه واشنطن يرمي الى ذلك بالذات.

    وفي الوقت ذاته امتنع كرولي عن ذكر قانون او مادة قانونية يمكن ان توجه الاتهامات بموجبها الى اسانج مصرحا انه ليس حقوقيا.
    تايم" الامريكية تمنح اسانج لقب "شخصية العام"
    فيما ذكرت مواقع الكترونية في الولايات المتحدة الامريكية ان اسبوعية "تايم" تنوي منح لقب "شخصية العام" لجوليان اسانج مؤسس موقع "ويكيليكس" الموجود حاليا رهن الاحتجاز في بريطانيا، ويمنح اللقب لشخص او مجموعة من الاشخاص الاكثر تأثيرا في الاحداث العالمية خلال السنة المعنية.
    وسينظر في قضية اسانج في احدى المحاكم البريطانية يوم 14 ديسمبر/كانون الاول.

    وقد منح هذا اللقب في العام الماضي لبن برنانكي رئيس الإحتياطي الفدرالي الأمريكي وفي عام 2008 لباراك اوباما وفي عام 2007 لفلاديمير بوتين.



    ألمانيا لا تريد التخلي عن السلاح النووي بسبب روسيا

    نشر موقع ويكيليكس الإلكتروني يوم 6 ديسمبر أسماء المنشآت الهامة ومكامن الثروات الطبيعية في الولايات المتحدة والعالم المدرجة على القائمة التي أعدتها وزارة الأمن الأمريكية في عام 2009.
    وعلقت مجلة "شبيغيل" الألمانية على تسريبات ويكيليكس هذه قائلة إن الوثائق السرية كشفت أن السفارة الأمريكية مدت أيدي مخبريها إلى أنحاء ألمانيا كافة.
    وتم كشف واحد من المخبرين اسمه هلموت ميتزنر، وهو رئيس مكتب زعيم الحزب الليبرالي الألماني. واعترف ميتزنر الذي أعفي من منصبه يوم الخميس الماضي بأنه زود السفارة الأمريكية بمعلومات تهم واشنطن.
    وعلى سبيل المثال أخبر ميتزنر السفارة الأمريكية في خريف 2009 بأن زعيم الحزب الليبرالي فسترفيلي طالب المستشارة الألمانية ميركل بأن تبحث مع الحلفاء الأمريكان إجلاء القنابل النووية الأمريكية من ألمانيا.
    وأقلق هذا الخبر واشنطن، فتوجهت وزارة الخارجية الأمريكية باستفسار إلى السيد كريستوف هويسغين، مستشار ميركل للشؤون الخارجية. وأهدأ الأخير بال الأمريكان بقوله إن موضوع السلاح النووي طرحه زعيم الحزب الليبرالي في حين أن الحكومة الألمانية لا ترى مبررا لإخلاء ألمانيا من قطع السلاح النووي التكتيكي العشرين المتبقية في وقت تملك روسيا فيه آلاف القطع.
    وبعد نشر هذه المعلومات دعا البعض إلى طرد السفير الأمريكي من ألمانيا. إلا أن المتحدث الرسمي باسم المستشارة الألمانية ميركل أعلن أن الحكومة الألمانية لا تدعو إلى طرد السفير الأمريكي.




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